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ABSTRACT 
 
Divisionalization, Product Cannibalization and Product Location Choice:  
Evidence from the U.S. Automobile Industry. (December 2003) 
Eui Jeong, B.B.A., Seoul National University; 
M.B.A., Seoul National University 
Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee: Dr. Javier Gimeno 
         Dr. Albert A. Cannella, Jr. 
 
 
This study argues that a firm’s product location choice may be a function of the 
firm’s way of splitting the product market (i.e., divisionalization) and the concern for 
product cannibalization at the division and the firm levels. The focus of this study is at 
the division level and a division’s new product location choice vis-à-vis its own products 
(intra-divisional new product distance), the products of a rival division of competing 
firms (inter-firm divisional new product distance), and the products of a sister division of 
the same firm (intra-firm divisional new product distance). The hypotheses were tested 
using data on the U.S. automobile industry between 1979 and 1999. 
The results show that a focal division with a high level of inter-firm divisional 
domain overlap with a rival division, relative to the focal division’s own domain, is more 
likely to locate its new product (here new car model) closer to that rival’s existing car 
models. And it was also found that divisional density affects a division’s new product 
location choice. But this study didn’t find any significant role of divisional status on new 
product location choice. And contrary to our expectation, the results of intra-firm divi-
sional domain overlap and new product location choice suggest that inter-divisional 
 iv 
  
product cannibalization might not be such an important concern when divisions intro-
duce their new products, as we had originally expected.  
By addressing the firm’s competitive engagement in the context of a division’s 
new product location choice, this study expands the basic logic of market overlap at the 
firm level into the unit- or division-level, and highlights how a division’s new product 
location choice is affected by intra-firm divisional structural relationship as well as inter-
firm divisional structural relationship. In so doing, this study hopes to contribute to the 
literature on divisionalization, new product location choice, competition at the unit-level, 
and product cannibalization, among others.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH 
 
Motivation of the Research 
 
When a firm introduces a new product in the market, it should consider how 
much similarity its new product should have in terms of product characteristics in com-
parison with rival products and/or its own existing products. A high degree of similarity 
to rival products may increase the demand of a new product but could trigger intense 
competition, whereas too much difference from rival products may relax potential price 
competition but could not attract customers who patronize rival products. In addition to 
these effects vis-à-vis competitors, a new product that has similar product characteristics 
or attributes to those of existing products may result in product cannibalization. Thus, 
choosing the product characteristics of a new product (i.e., product location choice) has 
significant ramifications on product market competition and internal competition, conse-
quently, overall firm performance.  
Industrial organization economists have addressed this issue under the topic of 
product differentiation (e.g., Hotelling, 1929; d’Aspermont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse, 
1979; Shaked and Sutton, 1982). They have argued that the degree of product differen-
tiation (i.e., from minimum differentiation to maximum differentiation) varies depending 
on such factors as the degree of competition, the distribution of demand within the prod-
uct space, the order of entry, number of firms, and number of product dimensions or 
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characteristics, among others. For example, Hotelling (1929) demonstrated that, in a du-
opoly characterized with inelastic demand, linear transportation cost, homogeneous 
goods, and unequal prices, minimum differentiation is an equilibrium (i.e., two firms are 
paired at the center of the market and split the market). d’Aspermont, et al. (1979), how-
ever, showed that under quadratic transportation cost and elastic demand, maximum dif-
ferentiation is an equilibrium outcome (i.e., firms locate their products as far apart as 
possible from their competing products). In a similar vein, some other studies showed 
that maximum product differentiation would occur as an equilibrium in the presence of 
price competition (Shaked and Sutton, 1982) or in the absence of subsequent entry by 
competitors (Prescott and Visscher, 1977).  
It should be noted, however, that the models of product differentiation are gener-
ally quite basic (e.g., two-stage games with no repeated interaction, two firms with one 
or two products) and the results are quite sensitive to assumptions (e.g., simultaneous vs. 
sequential move, elastic vs. inelastic demand, Cournot vs. Bertrand competition). In real-
ity, there are multiple firms in a market offering multiple products against multiple com-
peting products. For example, when there are three firms, almost anything goes as an 
equilibrium (Bensaid and de Palma, 1994). And the literature on product differentiation 
has mainly focused on product differentiation between a focal firm and competing firms, 
but not on product differentiation among the products offered by the same firm. For a 
multiproduct firm, depending on how similar a new product is to other products of the 
same firm, the newly introduced product may cannibalize the firm’s own existing prod-
ucts. Product cannibalization or cannibalism refers to a phenomenon or the extent to 
which the sales of a firm's new product reduces the sales of another product or other 
products offered by the same firm (Copulsky, 1976; Traylor, 1986; Mason and Milne, 
1994). 
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Product cannibalization is an important phenomenon in new product introduction 
because it affects the revenue stream of new product introduction. The revenue streams 
from a new product introduction can be broken into three sources: revenues from market 
expansion, revenues taken from competing products, and revenues from other products 
offered by the same firm (Traylor, 1986). The first and the second sources represent 
revenues from direct effect and strategic effect of new product introduction, respectively 
(cf. Tirole, 1988), whereas the third represents cannibalized sales due to a new product 
introduction. The ideal situation would be the case when the third portion is zero, i.e., all 
new revenues come from expanding market and/or are taken from competing firms’ 
sales. But this ideal situation is very hard to obtain since many firms offer multiple 
products and may launch variants of existing products through brand extension or line 
extension (Hardie, 1994; Reddy, Holak, and Bhat, 1994; Aaker and Keller, 1990), which 
may make cannibalization virtually inevitable. This is particularly true in very high 
competitive markets where new product introductions are a matter of course (Traylor, 
1986; D’Aveni, 1994) and firms should preempt competitors by cannibalizing current 
competitive advantages with next-generation advantages (Nault and Vandenbosch, 1998) 
before competitors steal the market. Therefore I believe cannibalization should be con-
sidered as an important factor in understanding firms’ choice of product features (i.e., 
product location choice), product location choice, regardless of whether it is an error that 
should be avoided (Copulsky, 1976), or a strategic option for gaining or maintaining 
competitive advantages (Chandy and Tellis, 1998; Nault and Vandenbosch, 1998). 
Related to cannibalization, the literature on product differentiation has not paid 
much attention to the role of a division as an entity to develop and launch a new product 
into the market. Nowadays many large firms have multiple operating divisions and these 
divisions are responsible for developing and introducing a new product, and the deci-
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sions that divisional managers make include price, product features, marketing, or pro-
curement, among others (Chandler, 1995[1962]). When two divisions of the same firm 
offer very similar products, we may expect product cannibalization for the firm as a 
whole. But this does not necessarily mean that both divisions are cannibalizing each 
other: one division may cannibalize the other division’s products, but not vice versa. In 
this case, this cannibalization would increase the former division’s sales and possibly 
profits, but on the other division. Thus, we may expect that these two divisions might 
develop quite different attitudes or reactions to the cannibalization, which would affect 
their behaviors including product location choice. Therefore it is necessary to take into 
account how the structural relations between divisions affect their decisions of product 
location choice. 
Based on this recognition, this study addresses product location choice of the 
firm that has multidivisional structure and the role of a division as an entity to choose the 
location of its new product (in product characteristics space). New product could be de-
veloped either by a single division or by cross-divisional project teams under the direc-
tion of corporate headquarters. In the former case, the location of a newly introduced 
product would fully reflect the focal division’s interests or concerns. And in the latter 
case, we could expect that the location would reflect the firm-wide interests or concerns, 
but at the same time, it would also incorporate the interests or concerns of the focal divi-
sion that is responsible for marketing the newly introduced product.  
 
Scope of the Research 
 
This study addresses product location choice from the perspective of a firm that 
has multidivisional (M-form) structure. M-form structure could be roughly characterized 
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as a divisionalized structure with an internal control apparatus (e.g., resource allocation, 
incentive design for division managers) in the hands of corporate headquarters (William-
son, 1975, 1985; Chandler, 1995[1962]). Among different types of M-forms (William-
son, 1975), the focus is on so-called pure M-form structure of type D1 that represents a 
highly integrated M-form enterprise that produces (possibly) differentiated but otherwise 
common final products or services (e.g., automobile industry, PC industry, etc.). This 
type of M-form is different from the so-called pure M-form of type D2 that denotes an 
M-form firm that produces diversified final products or services (e.g., General Electric). 
Through divisionalization each division came to have its own divisional charter 
or domain. Divisional charter and domain refers to “the businesses (i.e., product and 
market arenas) in which a division actively participate and for which it is responsible 
within the corporation.” (Galunic and Eisenhardt, 1996: 256). Divisional charters are 
building blocks that constitute the corporate domain or organizational domain (cf. 
Thompson, 1967). (Hereafter the terms ‘domain’ and ‘charter’ are used interchangea-
bly.) Divisional domains or charters are not once-and-for-all creations. At a point in 
time, divisional charters are explicitly fixed and recognized by other divisions and by 
corporate headquarters, but they change over time due to several reasons: the emergence 
of new business opportunities or growing unfit between divisional charters and relevant 
divisions’ capabilities, among others (Galunic and Eisenhardt, 1996, 2000). Or a division 
can increase or shrink its own charter by introducing new products or eliminating exist-
ing products. 
The notion of a divisional domain implies that the way a firm splits its corpora-
tion domain into several divisional domains may affect the way the firm behaves in the 
market including its overall product location choice. Based on this recognition this study 
specifically focuses on three aspects that are closely related to divisional domains. First, 
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this study addresses the role of the status of a division in a firm in that division’s new 
product location choice. Status is defined as the relative position of a division in a hier-
archy of divisions in a firm on the dimensions of economic hierarchy, political hierarchy, 
and prestige hierarchy (cf. Benoit-Smullyan, 1944). Status is a relational characteristic 
that is defined in a network of relations; and here the relationship is among the divisions 
of the same firm. So there can be three types of status: economic status, political status, 
and prestige status (Benoit-Smullyan, 1944).1 Status affects the behavior of the status 
holder at the individual, group, and organization levels. Individuals from different status 
show different behaviors (Moore, 1968, 1969; Leffler, Gillespie, and Conaty, 1982; Ber-
ger, Cohen, and Zelditch, 1972), the degree of status differences among groups affects 
the degree of conflicts among them (Manheim, 1960), and a wine producer’s status in 
the market relative to competing firms affects that producer’s decision on product qual-
ity (Benjamin and Podolny, 1999). So we may expect that a division’s intra-firm status 
will affect that division’s decisions and actions in general and product location choice in 
particular. Specifically this study expects that a higher status division would exercise 
more discretion in its product location choice than a lower status division due to its abil-
ity to garner more resources from corporate headquarters and its privileged positions 
against other lower status divisions in the firm.  
Second, this study explores the implications of divisional domain overlap be-
tween a focal division and a rival division of a competing firm (inter-firm divisional 
overlap) on the focal division’s decision on product location choice vis-à-vis the prod-
                                                
1 In the context of market, Podolny (1993: 830) defines a producer’s status as “the perceived quality of 
that producer’s products in relation to the perceived quality of that producer’s competitors’ products.” 
From Benoit-Smullyan’s (1944) point of view, Podolny’s (1993) definition is primarily close to prestige 
status and in some sense to economic status since a producer’s status leads to better performance (cf. Ben-
jamin and Podolny, 1999). In the case of the model of status-based market competition (e.g., Podolny, 
1993, 1994; Benjamin and Podolny, 1999), the status of a firm is determined in the market, whereas in this 
study the status of a division is determined inside a firm. 
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ucts of that rival division. In general the literature on organizational ecology, IO eco-
nomics, and strategic management suggests that the degree of divisional domain overlap 
between a focal firm and competing firms is positively related to the intensity of compe-
tition the focal firm experiences (Hannan and Freeman, 1977, 1989; Scherer and Ross, 
1990; Tirole, 1988; Porter, 1980). This is because firms targeting similar markets have 
similar resource requirements, which increases the potential for competition.2 Some of 
prior studies on new product introduction also show that differences in market share 
matter in new product introduction in general (Mitchell, 1989; Christensen and Bower, 
1996) and product location choice in particular (Eaton and Lipsey, 1979; Thomas and 
Weigelt, 2000). The argument of divisional charter or domain (Galunic and Eisenhardt, 
1996, 2000) or organizational domain (Thompson, 1967) also suggests that the resource 
requirements of a focal division should be quite similar with those of a rival division that 
serves similar domain or charter. So this study expects that the degree of resource re-
quirements overlap between a focal division and rival divisions would affect the focal 
division’s product location choice.  
Third, this study examines the impact of divisional domain overlap between a fo-
cal division and another division of the same firm (intra-firm divisional overlap) on the 
focal division’s product location choice. From the firm’s point of view, domain overlap 
between divisions of the same firm implies the existence of product cannibalization. But 
from a focal division’s perspective, firm-level cannibalization does not necessarily mean 
                                                
2 Even though the breadth of overlapped market increases, the intensity of competition may not increase 
proportionately because the competition may be diffuse over a greater scope of markets and the need for 
mutual forbearance also increases (cf. Edwards, 1955; Gimeno and Woo, 1996; Baum and Korn, 1996). 
However, it also should be mentioned that mutual forbearance works well when market boundaries are 
well defined (Singal, 1996), among others. But in a differentiated industry, which this study is concerned 
with, products are usually related to one another, i.e., the demands of two separate products are related 
through the products between the two (Schmalensee, 1978; Gabszewicz), which may suppress mutual for-
bearance.  
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‘cannibalization’ of its own (i.e., intra-divisional cannibalization) as long as the focal di-
vision does not cannibalize its own existing products due to its new product. In other 
words, if the focal division’s new product takes sales from the products of other divi-
sions of the same firm (i.e., inter-divisional cannibalization), this becomes product can-
nibalization for the firm, but it is not a cannibalization for the focal division. This in-
triguing nature of cannibalization at the firm and division levels may provide some clues 
in understanding divisions’ product location choice. 
The literature on product cannibalization suggests that it should be avoided in 
general (e.g., Copulsky, 1976), which may suggest that high degree of division domain 
overlap would lead divisions in question to locate their new products away from other 
divisions of the same firm, either forced by corporate headquarters or voluntarily by the 
divisions. However, the literature also indicates that under certain circumstances canni-
balization can be a strategic option (Traylor, 1986; Chandy and Tellis, 1998; Kerin, Har-
vey, and Rothe, 1978), which may imply that intra-firm divisional domain overlap would 
not necessarily lead divisions to locate their products far away from the products of other 
divisions. The study expects that the portion of overlap from the perspective of a focal 
firm and the firm’s attitude toward cannibalization would affect the focal division’s 
product location choice vis-à-vis the products of other divisions in the firm. 
In summary, this study addresses product location choice from the perspective of 
a division in the firm that has multidivisional structure (type D1): a focal division’s 
status, the degree of division domain overlap between a focal division and a rival divi-
sion (inter-firm divisional overlap), and the degree of divisional domain overlap between 
a focal division and a sister division of the same firm (intra-firm divisional overlap). 
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Basic Research Questions 
 
This study addresses the following basic research questions. 
 
1. How does a division’s intra-firm status relative to other divisions of the same 
firm affect the division’s product location choice?  
2. How does the degree of divisional domain overlap between a focal division 
and a rival division of competing firms (i.e., inter-firm divisional overlap) af-
fect the focal division’s product location choice?  
3. How does the degree of divisional domain overlap between a focal division 
and another division of the same firm (i.e., intra-firm divisional overlap) af-
fect the focal division’s product location choice? 
 
To address these questions, this study will synthesize (1) literature on multidivi-
sional structure developed in strategic management field and economics; (2) sociological 
literature on status; (3) literature on product differentiation accumulated in IO econom-
ics; and (4) product cannibalization arguments from marketing and economics.   
 
Contributions of the Research 
 
By addressing the impact of divisionalization on product location choice using 
the arguments of multidivisional structure, product differentiation, status, and product 
cannibalization, this study contributes to the literature of strategic management in sev-
eral important ways. First, this study is expected to enrich the literature on product dif-
ferentiation. Up to now the majority of research on product differentiation has been done 
from IO economics perspectives (e.g., Hotelling, 1929; d’Aspremont, et al., 1979; Pres-
cott and Visscher, 1979; Shaked and Sutton, 1982; Eaton and Lipsey, 1979; Brander and 
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Eaton, 1984). By incorporating the perspectives of sociology, strategic management, and 
marketing, this study contributes to the body of knowledge on product location choice. 
Basically this study adds a couple of arguments in understanding a firm’s product loca-
tion choice. This study demonstrates that the way a firm splits its product market scope 
affects the overall product location choice of the firm. This is because through division-
alization the firm shapes (1) the relationship between the general office and divisions, 
(2) the structural relationship between its own divisions and the divisions of competing 
firms, and (3) the structural relationship among its own divisions inside the firm. And 
the concern for intra-divisional and inter-divisional product cannibalization, along with 
the structural relationships, also plays a role in explaining a division’s product location 
choice.  
Second, this study is expected to provide some evidence on the impact of organ-
izational structure on firm behavior and thereby provides evidence to the hypothesis that 
strategy follows structure. Unlike the argument that structure follows strategy, the hy-
pothesis that structure affects strategy has not drawn sufficient attention from scholars in 
the strategic management field. It is very hard to find studies that directly address the 
hypothesis (Notable exceptions are Hoskisson and Hitt (1988) and Argyres (1996)). 
Rather, scholars have paid attention to the relationship between organizational structure 
and firm performance (e.g., Armour and Teece, 1978; Hill, 1985; Hoskisson and 
Galbraith, 1985; Teece, 1981), or the moderating role of diversification strategy on the 
relationship between organizational structure and firm performance (e.g., Hill and Hosk-
isson, 1987; Hill, Hitt, and Hoskisson, 1992; Hoskisson, 1987). Some other scholars 
studied the moderating effect of SBU strategy on the relationship between decentraliza-
tion and SBU effectiveness (Gupta, 1987; Govindarajan, 1986). However, they did not 
address the direct relationship between organizational structure and SBU competitive 
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behavior, either. In sum, most of the relevant studies have not focused on the impact of 
structure on firm strategic behavior, but they rather focused on (1) the direct effect of or-
ganizational structure on performance; or (2) the implications of organizational structure 
on performance from the perspective of contingency theory. 
Third, related to the above, the study will contribute to the literature on competi-
tive dynamics by exploring another source of competition: divisionalization and product 
cannibalization. Regarding the sources of competition, scholars have found out that the 
following factors matter: top management team composition (e.g., Hambrick, Cho, and 
Chen, 1996), the similarity of resource profiles and strategies among firms (e.g., Chen, 
1996; Gimeno and Woo, 1996), market commonality (e.g., Chen, 1996; Gimeno and 
Woo, 1996, 1999; Gimeno, 1999), strategic group membership (e.g., Caves and Porter, 
1977; McGee and Thomas, 1986), and past performance (Miller and Chen, 1994; Greve, 
1998), among others,. However, scholars have not paid sufficient attention to the role 
that divisionalization may play in the firm’s competitive actions. 
 
Organization of the Research 
 
This study is organized as follows. First, in Chapter 2, I review the IO economics 
literature on product differentiation and the strategic management literature on business 
units. This review provides theoretical and empirical research findings related to these 
topics. In so doing, the arguments and empirical findings are summarized and critically 
evaluated. It should be noted, however, that the review is not exhaustive.  
Second, in Chapter 3, I present a theoretical framework and hypotheses that ex-
plain the impact of divisionalization and product cannibalization on product location 
choice. The theoretical framework is based on the arguments of product cannibalization 
   
  
12
in marketing and economics, product differentiation in industrial organization, status in 
sociological literature, and organizational niche in organizational ecology. 
Third, Chapter 4 introduces research methods for the study. This chapter de-
scribes sample and data, and presents operational definitions of the variables. And this 
chapter presents statistical models and techniques for various estimations, including 
those for testing the hypotheses laid out in the previous chapter.  
Fourth, in Chapter 5, I report the results of the analyses. Here I start with some 
preliminary analyses and their results that are necessary for the main analyses of the 
study. Specifically I report descriptive statistics and correlation tables, and the results of 
hypotheses testing, among others. And I also provide proper interpretations of the esti-
mates. 
Finally, Chapter 6 discusses the implications of the results. The implications are 
not restricted to statistically significant results; they also address the results that didn’t 
receive statistically significant support (i.e., either statistically non-significant or signifi-
cant but with the wrong direction in terms of the sign of the coefficients), but could help 
us better understand the firm’s new product location choice at the division level. This 
chapter also discusses some caveats in interpreting the results. In addition to the caveats, 
this chapter also suggests several future research directions out of the current research. 
This chapter concludes with an executive summary.  
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter I review the literature on product location choice and business 
units. The literature review is not intended to be exhaustive but is focused on prior works 
that are relevant for the current study. First, the chapter reviews the extant literature on 
product location. The literature on product location choice or product differentiation has 
been accumulated mainly in IO economics after Hotelling’s (1929) seminal work on spa-
tial product differentiation. I focus on the basic notions of product differentiation and re-
view the literature on the basis of theoretical assumptions. Since there are several excel-
lent works that have documented the developments of this topic, the focus will be on the 
key issues on product differentiation.  
Second, the chapter reviews some of the prior works that addressed the business 
unit of the firm. I don’t intend to provide an exhaustive review on the literature that ad-
dresses organizational structure. Rather the chapter specifically focuses on some recent 
works that have addressed organizational structure and its impact on business unit strat-
egy or outcome. 
 
Product Differentiation 
 
When firms announce that they will introduce a new product that is ‘different’ 
from competing products in the market, what do they mean by ‘different’? If a product 
   
  
14
can be regarded as a bundle of characteristics (e.g., Lancaster, 1979), what differentiates 
a certain product from others is the characteristics that it possesses (Beath and Katsoula-
cos, 1991; Tirole, 1988; Eaton and Lipsey, 1989). For example, Toyota Camry, Honda 
Acura, and Ford Taurus belong to the same market segment classified by Automotive 
News. But these three products are different from one another in terms of their respective 
length, width, height, horsepower, or fuel efficiency, etc. So if we can represent each 
characteristic as a dimension in n-dimensional characteristics space, a product can be 
thought of as a point consisted of the n-values of n-characteristics. Thus, the distance be-
tween any two products in product characteristics space represents the degree of differ-
entiation between the two products.  
Then why do firms want to differentiate their products from their competitors’ 
products or rival products? An immediate answer would be that sufficient product dif-
ferentiation allows firms to be a monopolist in relation to its own product without the 
worry of intense price competition (Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1986a; Brander and Eaton, 
1984). However, if a firm differentiated its products too much from rival products, this 
may restrict its ability to compete effectively in its competitors’ product markets (Gab-
szewicz and Thisse, 1986a). Thus, the firm has incentives to differentiate its products, 
however within certain limits. Beath and Katsoulacos (1991: 6) point this out as follows: 
 
If firms in a particular group produce goods which are differentiated, the 
product of the different firms are imperfect substitutes for each other and, 
as we hinted earlier, this gives each firm the potential to act as a monopo-
list in relation to its own product. It is this potential for monopoly profits, 
due to the fact that it reduces the sensitivity to competitive moves, that 
provides firms with the basic incentive to differentiate their product. 
However while differentiation enables a firm to insulate its own market to 
a symmetric one, and it also makes it harder for the firm to effectively 
compete in its rivals’ own markets. Hence differentiation may well cut it 
off from a much larger market.  
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The literature on product differentiation accumulated in IO economics is the re-
sult of addressing some ‘awkward facts’ that we can easily find in the real world. These 
awkward facts have constrained theorizing about product differentiation (Eaton and Lip-
sey, 1989: 725-726). These facts include (1) many industries, including most that prod-
uct consumers’ goods, produce large number of similar but differentiated products; (2) 
the consumers’ goods produced by different firms in the same industry are differentiated 
from one another so that two products produced by two different firms are rarely, if ever, 
identical; (3) the set of products made by firms in any one industry is a small subset of 
the set of possible products; (4) in most industries each firm produces a range of differ-
entiated products; (5) any one consumer purchases a small subset of the products that are 
available from any one industry; (6) consumers perceive the differences among differen-
tiated products to be real and there is often approximate agreement on which ones are, or 
are not, close substitutes; and (7) tastes are revealed to vary among consumers because 
different consumers purchase different bundles of differentiated commodities and these 
differences cannot be fully accounted for by difference in their incomes. According to 
Eaton and Lipsey (1989), the literature on product differentiation is the result of answer-
ing questions that are related to the above-mentioned awkward facts: the processes that 
gave rise to these facts? the positive and normative implications of these facts? 
There are many studies that provide a comprehensive or succinct overview of the 
core idea and development of product differentiation in IO economics: Eaton and Lipsey 
(1989), Gabszewicz and Thisse, (1986b), Beath and Katsoulacos (1991), Gabszewicz 
(1999), and Greenhut, Norman, and Hung (1986), Lancaster (1990) among others. Thus, 
this study does not provide an exhaustive review of the current literature on product dif-
ferentiation accumulated in IO economics. Rather than providing a comprehensive re-
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view on product differentiation, this study addresses major points of the literature fol-
lowing major works in this field.  
Depending on the approaches to consumers’ preferences on the demand side of 
the problem of product differentiation, the literature classifies horizontal product differ-
entiation into two branches: address vs. non-address branch (Archibald, Eaton, and Lip-
sey, 1986). Address branch posits “a distribution of consumers’ tastes over some con-
tinuous space of parameters describing the nature of products. Different consumers have 
different most preferred locations in this space and thus can be thought of as having dif-
ferent addresses in that space. Products are also defined by their addresses in the space, 
and this makes the set of all possible products infinite” (Eaton and Lipsey, 1989: 727). 
And consumers choose the product that is closest to their most preferred location in the 
product characteristics space. Since Hotelling’s (1929) seminal work, most of the works 
on product differentiation have followed this approach. Non-address branch posits that 
“consumers’ preferences for differentiated goods are defined over a predetermined set of 
all possible goods, which may be finite or countably infinite” (Eaton and Lipsey, 1989: 
728). Chamberlin’s (1933) monopolistic competition is consistent with this branch. With 
respect to consumers’ purchase of differentiated goods, this branch has been addressed 
either by the representative consumer approach (e.g., Spence, 1976a, 1976b; Dixit and 
Stiglitz, 1977) or diverse consumer tastes approach (e.g., Perloff and Salop, 1985). This 
study is primarily concerned with address branch of the product differentiation models 
since the majority of studies on product differentiation belong to this branch. For a suc-
cinct summary of the difference between address and non-address branches, readers are 
referred to Eaton and Lipsey (1989) and Archibald, et al. (1986). This study focuses on 
address branch which was started by Hotelling’s (1929) seminal work. 
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Several main features of product differentiation  
 
The current IO literature on product differentiation exhibits several interesting 
features (Eaton and Lipsey, 1989; Gabszewicz, 1999; Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1986b). 
First, the models are very simple. Most studies rely on 2-stage game theoretic models 
where firms choose product location in the 1st stage and then choose either price or quan-
tity in the 2nd stage of the model. And the majority of models is based on a duopoly 
situation where each firm is a single-product firm and the product has one-dimensional 
characteristic. Second, the results are very sensitive to ad hoc assumptions of the models: 
simultaneous move vs. sequential move, price competition vs. quantity competition, 
elastic demand vs. inelastic demand, or linear transportation cost vs. quadratic transpor-
tation cost, among others. For example, the assumption of quadratic transportation cost 
amplifies the effects of price competition compared with the assumption of linear trans-
portation cost. Third, when the models incorporate some realities in their specifications, 
the results are unconventional. For example, when the models assume that a product can 
have more than one product characteristic, the results show that both maximum and 
minimum differentiation could happen in a single product. And when the models assume 
multiple firms introducing multiple products, it is very hard to obtain clear-cut results, 
say either maximal or minimal differentiation.  
The following review on the literature provides these features in detail. The re-
view proceeds according to different assumptions or settings that have been addressed in 
the literature. For a more detailed and complete treatment of the literature on product dif-
ferentiation, readers are referred to Eaton and Lipsey (1989), Gabszewicz and Thisse 
(1986b), Gabszewicz (1999), and Beath and Katsoulacos (1991), among others. 
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One-dimensional product characteristic and duopoly 
The literature on product differentiation practically started with Hotelling’s 
(1929) model of spatial competition. Hotelling (1929) starts with the recognition that, 
contrary to the tacit assumption, a firm that charges a higher price over homogeneous 
products does not lose all of its sales instantaneously. To examine this intuition, he as-
sumed several properties of a duopoly of homogeneous goods: (1) customers are uni-
formly distribute along a line of finite length (say a main street in a town); (2) each firm 
chooses a location simultaneously (and then engage in Bertrand competition); (3) cus-
tomer demand is extremely inelastic (consumers consume one unit or zero per unit of 
time irrespective of the price); (4) consumers incur a transportation cost t per unit of 
length (thus, total cost for consumers consists of mill price and transportation cost); (5) 
consumers don’t have any preference over either firm except for price and transportation 
cost; and (6) production cost is zero. And two firms choose price and location in such a 
manner to maximize their profits. Based on the above assumptions, Hotelling (1929) 
demonstrated that two firms would locate themselves at the center of the line (i.e., mar-
ket) and split the market into two halves (each half for each firm): principle of minimal 
differentiation. It should be noted that this equilibrium outcome is not consistent with the 
social optimum that minimizes transportation cost for consumers: social optimum occurs 
when two firms locate at the first and the third quartiles.  
Unlike Hotelling (1929), Smithies (1941) assumed conjectural variation and elas-
tic demand. He demonstrated that the concern for conjectural variation – a competitor’s 
reaction by changing price or by changing both price and location – would make firms 
locate toward the center while not to the point of minimum differentiation; and with 
elastic demand, firms have incentives not to move too much toward the center since this 
will result in the loss of customers near the end of the market, which mitigate the ten-
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dency toward minimum differentiation. Related to Smithies’ (1941) assumption of linear 
demand, Nero (1999) also shows that under linear demand and a two-stage game (loca-
tion-price), duopolists have incentives to relax price competition through maximum 
product differentiation when the reservation price is high enough. 
The biggest challenge to Hotelling’s (1929) principle of minimum differentiation 
came a half a century later by d’Aspremont, et al. (1979) who showed that Hotelling’s 
(1929) equilibrium is not equilibrium. They showed that at least one firm has an incen-
tive to maximize its profits by raising or undercutting its own price. When two firms are 
located very close to each other (i.e., their products are quite similar to each other), price 
competition would intensify. In this case, at least one firm can increase its profits either 
(1) by relocating its position farther from the other and raising its price; or (2) by relocat-
ing its position (i.e., product) infinitesimally closer to the competing product and under-
cutting its own price. Thus, d’Aspremont, et al. (1979) suggest that minimum 
differentiation could not be an equilibrium outcome since no price equilibrium solution 
exists unless both firms are sufficiently far apart from each other. As an alternative out-
come, they took an example when transportation costs are not linear per unit length but 
quadratic. They demonstrated that when transportation cost is quadratic, the equilibrium 
outcome is not minimum differentiation but maximum differentiation to relax price 
competition. It is now a well-known fact that the assumption of quadratic transportation 
costs magnifies the effect of price competition.   
d’Aspremont, et al’s (1979) equilibrium outcome of maximum differentiation 
was challenged by Bester (1998). He argues that when the quality is uncertain and con-
sumers rely on observed prices to ascertain the quality of products, the equilibrium out-
come would be minimal differentiation. This is because consumers’ imperfect informa-
tion about the quality characteristics of products reduces firms’ incentives to horizontally 
   
  
20
differentiate their products from rival products. His analysis is on experience goods. In 
sum, Bester (1998) supports the idea of head-on competition. This argument is close to 
the arguments when price is exogenous. In this case, price is very rigid due to its quality 
signaling property. As prices become rigid due to signaling reasons, firms would enjoy 
positive profits and they become less motivated to relax price competition through prod-
uct differentiation. The author further argues that this line of reasoning could be applica-
ble to vertical differentiation (cf. Shaked and Sutton, 1982). 
In a slightly different vein, Bockem (1994) challenges both Hotelling (1929) and 
d’Aspremont, et al. (1979). According to Bockem (1994), both demand-increasing effect 
of minimum differentiation (Hotelling, 1929) and price-relaxing effect of maximum dif-
ferentiation (d’Aspremont, et al., 1979) are algebraic accidents. He demonstrates that 
when consumers have an outside option (i.e., if consumers’ choice set is expanded), in 
equilibrium neither minimum nor maximum differentiation will occur. 
For a vertical product differentiation, Shaked and Sutton (1982) argue that 
maximal differentiation is an equilibrium outcome. In a three-stage game model of verti-
cal differentiation (entry-quality-price), Shaked and Sutton (1982) demonstrate that mar-
ket equilibrium occurs when two potential entrants choose to enter the market; these two 
firms choose their respective products maximally differentiated from each other’s prod-
uct; and these two firms make positive profits. Firms differentiate their products in terms 
of quality to relax price competition. When there are more than three firms, no firm will 
enjoy positive profits since competition in quality would drive all firms to produce the 
same top level of quality permitted while prices and profits become zero. One of the 
noteworthy assumptions of this model is that the upper-bound of income is twice the 
lower-bound income.  
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Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) also examined the effect of income dispersion on 
vertical product differentiation. In a duopoly game, they assumed that consumers have 
identical tastes but different income levels, firms produce products at no costs and pro-
vide relatively close substitutes, and consumers make indivisible and mutually exclusive 
purchases. Upon these assumptions, they derived the results that duopolists would have 
incentives to choose quality such that they maintain product differentiation from each 
other, i.e. from a sufficient degree to maximal product differentiation. 
In sum, in a two-stage duopoly game where each firm produces one product with 
single characteristic, what matters is whether (1) price is endogenous or exogenous; (2) 
demand is elastic or inelastic; or (3) price competition is intense or not (i.e., the form of 
transportation costs). When prices are endogenously decided, equilibrium outcome is 
hard to gain at least in horizontal differentiation (d’Aspremont, et al., 1979), unlike the 
case where prices are assumed to be quite rigid (Hotelling, 1929; Best, 1998). These 
studies further suggested that the (potential) existence of intense price competition 
would make firms differentiate their product from at least a sufficient degree to maxi-
mum degree from competing products to relax intense price competition (d’Aspremont, 
et al., 1979; Shaked and Sutton, 1982; Nero, 1999). These studies also demonstrate that 
when the demand is elastic, firms have more incentives to differentiate their products 
(Nero, 1999; Smithies, 1941). Thus, these results basically suggest that when price com-
petition is a concern and demand is elastic, which is usually the case, firms have incen-
tives to differentiate their products from competing products from a sufficient degree to 
the maximum degree. 
 
Multi-dimensional product characteristics and duopoly 
Some studies have focused on the case where products can have more than one 
characteristic. For horizontal differentiation, some studies showed that firms would pur-
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sue maximal differentiation in one dimension and minimal differentiation in the other 
dimension(s). Irmen and Thisse (1998) show that, in a duopoly under the assumption of 
quadratic transportation costs, the principle of minimal differentiation holds for all prod-
uct characteristics except for one characteristic. Duopolists choose to maximize differen-
tiation in the dominant characteristic (the characteristic with the largest or sufficiently 
large salience coefficient) but minimize differentiation in the other characteristics. An-
sari, Economides, and Steckel (1998) also show the same results in 2- and 3-dimensional 
characteristics spaces. They show that under quadratic transportation costs, duopolists 
choose maximum differentiation on one dimension (the characteristic that consumers put 
the highest weight) and minimum differentiation on other dimensions. In the case of 
minimum differentiation, firms cluster at the center of the characteristics in question. 
Vandenbosch and Weinberg (1995) demonstrate that the same result shown in 
horizontal differentiation holds for vertical differentiation. In a two-stage game (quality-
price) with two-dimensions of product characteristics, they show that in a duopoly, a 
firm chooses its product such that its product is maximally differentiation from rival 
product on one dimension, but minimally differentiated on the other dimension. One pe-
culiar characteristic of the study is the incorporation of position-dependent variable 
costs. This study is an extension of Shaked and Sutton (1982) that deals with one-
dimension vertical differentiation. 
In sum, the studies on multiple product characteristics suggest that, unlike one-
dimensional product characteristic, firms have multiple means to differentiate their 
products. This implies that depending on what characteristics are included in the equa-
tion, we may have quite different results. So we may wisely include characteristics that 
consumers put equally high importance on (Ansari, et al., 1998) and that are expensive 
to produce (Vandenbosch and Weinberg, 1995).  
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Multiple products or multiple firms and product differentiation 
Up to now I have reviewed the studies that have primarily focused on a duopoly 
where each firm has one product that has either one characteristic or multiple character-
istics. However, firms usually produce more than one product and compete against mul-
tiple rival products in the market, and there may be more than two firms in the market. 
Researchers have tried to incorporate this reality in their studies on product differentia-
tion. 
From the demand-side of product selection using non-address approach, Brander 
and Eaton (1984) model product line rivalry in a duopoly where each firm produces four 
possible products in a three-stage game (scope-location-quantity). Among the four prod-
ucts, two products are close substitutes for each other and are distant substitutes for the 
other pair, which are close substitutes for each other (say the pairs of (1,2) and (3,4) are 
close substitutes, whereas the pairs (1,3) or (2,4) are more distant substitutes). They 
show that when a firm is guaranteed a monopoly over a range of products, it will seek to 
launch products that are most distant substitutes of its current product lines. But when a 
range of potential products is limited to a group of established competing firms, i.e., un-
der intermediate levels of demand, each firm is more likely to seek to launch products 
that are close substitutes of its current products (segmented market structure). In so do-
ing each firm expects to avoid intense price and output competition at a later stage. And 
when there exists a threat of entry by outsiders, each firm would seek to develop prod-
ucts that are more distant substitutes (interlaced market structure), which would increase 
competition that would deter potential entry. Thus, Brander and Eaton (1984) suggest 
that in a growing market, the market structure may evolve from a monopoly, a seg-
mented duopoly, and an interlaced oligopoly. 
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Martinez-Giralt and Neven (1988) question Brander and Eaton (1984) by arguing 
that when price competition is intense, the question of endogenous multiple outlets com-
petition is void. In a two-stage game (location-price) of a duopoly with quadratic trans-
portation costs, they demonstrated that firms would locate their outlets as close as possi-
ble to each other (and will optimally collapse the outlets into a single point), whereas 
they locate their outlet as far away as possible from a rival outlet (maximum differentia-
tion). This result holds both in a circular and a linear paradigm. Therefore, neither firm 
takes up the opportunity to open two outlets in order to relax price competition (no prod-
uct line rivalry), i.e., the incentive to relax price competition dominates the incentive to 
segment the market. The assumption of quadratic costs is crucial for the results since this 
function generates the most intense price competition. 
Related to Martinez-Giralt and Neven (1988), from the recognition that the 
maximal differentiation is due to the assumption that firms are allowed only two outlets, 
Gabszewicz and Thisse (1986b) addressed the case where duopolists are allowed to in-
troduce as many outlets (in this case plants) as they want. They found that the equilib-
rium location is the one that duopolists differentiate their own outlets but locate their 
outlets next to their competitors’ outlets. Going one step further from Gabszewicz and 
Thisse (1986b), Bensaid and de Palma (1994) show that when there are three firms that 
can have two products, almost anything goes as an equilibrium outcome. In a two-stage 
model (location-price), Bensaid and de Palma (1994) suggest that maximum differentia-
tion may be due to the assumption that there are only two firms. They examined the 
situation where three firms locate themselves up to two outlets and found that almost 
anything goes as an equilibrium when there are three firms: reduced differentiation, 
maximal differentiation, and a variety of outcomes in between these two extremes.  
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Under the assumption of sufficient product and consumer heterogeneity, de 
Palma, Ginsburgh, Papgeorgiou, and Thisse (1985) showed that minimum differentiation 
at the center of the market is always an equilibrium outcome regardless of the number of 
firms in an industry. Here equilibrium prices are positive proportional to the degree of 
heterogeneity. This study is to test the sensitivity of minimum differentiation with re-
spect to homogeneity of products and consumers. But they also assume linear transporta-
tion cost and uniform distribution of consumers. 
In summary, when there are multiple firms with multiple products in the market, 
equilibrium is either hard to obtain or there many be infinite numbers of equilibrium 
(Brander and Eaton, 1984; Bensaid and de Palma, 1984). When firms compete with mul-
tiple competitors, firms not only consider how much they will differentiate their new 
products from rival products, but also take into account how close they will locate their 
new products in comparison with their current products. Thus, in addition to product dif-
ferentiation relative to rival products, product cannibalization should become an impor-
tant concern in new product introductions for multiple product firms.  
 
Sequential entry and product differentiation 
Most of the studies on product differentiation have assumed that firms move si-
multaneously. Several studies have addressed the case when firms move or enter sequen-
tially. One important study on sequential entry and product differentiation is Prescott and 
Visscher (1977). Under the assumption of foresighted sequential entry and costly reloca-
tion, Prescott and Visscher (1977) demonstrate the following results: (1) in location 
competition alone in a duopoly, i.e., conventional Hotelling-type model, the equilibrium 
is minimum differentiation at the center; for three firms, the equilibrium is that first two 
firms locate at the first and the third quartiles and the third firm locates between the two 
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firms; (2) under endogenous entry, the first two firms will locate themselves symmetri-
cally from the two ends of the market, respectively, and subsequent firms locate them-
selves sufficiently far away from the nearest firm until it is no longer profitable; (3) un-
der location and price competition, i.e., true Hotelling (with some modification to guar-
antee the existence of an equilibrium), maximum differentiation is an equilibrium out-
come for a duopoly and no equilibrium when there are three firms; and (4) under higher 
fixed cost of entry, the second entrant has incentives to locate as far away as possible 
from the first entrant since higher-fixed cost of entry serves as a barrier to entry. 
And under the assumption of sequential moves and a Stackelberg framework, 
Anderson (1987) demonstrates that the first firm locates at the center of the market and 
the second firm locates itself close to one of the ends of the spectrum. Thus, the equilib-
rium location is asymmetric, which is due to the nature of sequential entry. 
In sum, the above studies suggest that firms’ decision on new product location is 
dependent upon how current competitors position their products in the market and/or 
how potential entrants would position their products if they entered the market.  
 
Other issues of product differentiation 
 
In addition to the issues addressed up to now, the literature on product differen-
tiation addresses several important issues. These issues include the stability of equilib-
rium, the number of (optimal) firms in a differentiated industry, entry deterrence, and the 
relationship between horizontal and vertical differentiation, among others. With respect 
to the stability of equilibrium in horizontal and vertical differentiation, Gabszewicz and 
Thisse (1986a) show that there exist no (stable) price and location equilibrium under 
horizontal differentiation, whereas there always exists a stable price and location out-
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come under vertical differentiation. This [price equilibrium] is primarily due to the fact 
that concavity of demand almost never holds under horizontal differentiation, whereas 
the concavity of demand almost always holds under vertical differentiation.  
The number of firms is also an important issue in product differentiation because, 
under the assumption of a single-product firm, it determines the variety of products of an 
industry. With respect to vertical differentiation, Shaked and Sutton (1983) argue that, 
under the assumption that all qualities are produced and sold at marginal cost and con-
sumers would buy the highest quality, there can be at most a finite number of firms with 
positive market share in the industry since price competition among high-quality pro-
ducers would drive prices down, which ultimately pushes low-quality producers out of 
the market (so called finiteness property). Considering the entry in a vertically differen-
tiated industry, Gabszewicz and Thisse (1980) derived the number of firms that could 
coexist in the industry. When the upper bound is reached, any entry will lead to an exit 
by an existing firm in an industry, thus the number of firms is maintained. And entry 
would drive equilibrium prices to the level of competitive ones. This finiteness property 
in vertical differentiation is different from what we can find in horizontal differentiation. 
In horizontal differentiation, the equilibrium number of firms goes to infinity when entry 
cost becomes zero and the density of consumers tends to infinity (see Tirole, 1988).  
Regarding the entry in a differentiated industry, Schmalensee (1978) found that 
an incumbent firm could deter entry by proliferating brands since brand proliferation 
would leave no profitable niche for potential entrants. Eaton and Lipsey (1979) also 
demonstrated that, in a growing market, a foresighted monopolist would preempt poten-
tial entry by introducing a new product before a rival does. Judd (1985) questions the en-
try deterrence by brand proliferation (Schmalensee, 1978) by arguing that a potential en-
trant still can successfully enter if it can induce the incumbent to vacate one or more ad-
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dresses—a strategy of predatory entry—by either matching its new product to a rival 
product or locating it between the two rival products. For Judd (1985), what matters is 
exit cost rather than sunk cost itself when an incumbent firm decides whether to pull out 
a product. 
Traditionally horizontal differentiation and vertical differentiation have been 
treated separately. However, several studies suggest that they are more closely related to 
each other than we have thought. Cremer and Thisse (1991) argue that, under mild as-
sumptions on the transportation cost, any Hotelling-type model (horizontal product dif-
ferentiation model) is a special case of vertical product differentiation: the product loca-
tions in an equilibrium in the horizontal differentiation model are the qualities in an 
equilibrium model in the vertical differentiation model. However, the opposite does not 
necessarily hold (cf. Shaked and Sutton, 1983). Anglin (1992) also argues that the often 
cited difference between vertical and horizontal differentiation—all consumers agree on 
the ranking of types in a vertically differentiated market, whereas they disagree in a 
horizontally differentiated market—is less important in most cases. And “[t]he interest-
ing results in a vertically differentiated market do not arise from any agreement among 
consumers on the ranking of quality because any effect of such agreement can be offset 
by prices and the cost of production when consumers are concerned with price and qual-
ity.” (Anglin, 1992: 12) Thus, the decision rules that consumers use in a vertically and a 
horizontally differentiated market are the same due to income and substitution effects 
that occur due to a price change. 
In sum, the existing literature on product differentiation suggests that firms have 
incentives to maintain from the minimum to the maximum level of differentiation. And, 
the degree of differentiation is contingent upon the intensity of price competition, the 
number of firms, the number of products, the nature of demand, or the way firms (poten-
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tially) position their products in the market. However, what is missing here is that nowa-
days firms have multiple divisions and each division is responsible for managing a range 
of products. Thus, each division has its own competing products, and should interact 
with other divisions of the same firm in terms of resource allocation and divisional char-
ter change under the same corporate headquarters. This may pose a new issue in under-
standing product location choice compared with the existing literature that exclusively 
focuses on the firm as a unifying whole, which forms the basis of the theoretical argu-
ments and testable hypotheses that are presented in the next chapter. 
 
Organizational Structure, Strategy, and Business Units 
 
Organizational structure and strategy 
 
Regardless of whether we favor “structure follows strategy” over “structure con-
tains or follows strategy,” or vice versa, it is universally agreed upon among scholars 
that structure and strategy are closed related to each other. Chandler’s (1995 [1962]) 
pioneering work on the emergence of M-form structure in the business world has been 
regarded as a representative of the former hypothesis and has inspired many works since 
then. What is interesting is that Chandler (1995[1962]) himself actively recognized the 
impact of structure on strategy.  
 
Thus structure has as much impact on strategy as strategy had on struc-
ture. But because the changes in strategy came chronologically before 
those of structure, and perhaps also because an editor at The MIT Press 
talked to me into changing the title from Structure and Strategy to Strat-
egy and Structure, the book appears to concentrate on how strategy de-
fines structure rather than on how structure affects strategy. My goal from 
the start was to study the complex interconnections in a modern industrial 
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enterprise between structure and strategy, and an ever-changing external 
environment.(Chandler, 1995[1962]: Introduction) 
 
Structure has an impact on strategy by influencing the flows of information and 
the way organizational participants interact with one another (Miller, 1987; Fredrickson, 
1986). For example, Hammond (1994) demonstrates how the same raw data can be in-
terpreted in different ways by M-form and U-form structures. Since the interpretation of 
raw data is different, decision-making would be different. 
Some empirical works support the notion that structure affects strategy. For ex-
ample, Miller (1987) investigated the relationship between three aspects of so-called 
‘dominant’ structure (formalization, centralization, complexity) and three dimensions of 
strategy-making (rationality, assertiveness, interaction). Rationality dimension includes 
analysis, future orientation/planning, explicitness of strategy, and systematic scanning of 
environment; interaction dimension includes consensus building and bargaining in a de-
cision-making process; and assertiveness dimension concerns proactiveness and risk-
taking in decision-making. The results show that structural formalization is related to ra-
tionality and interaction dimensions and proactiveness aspects of assertiveness. Centrali-
zation was found to be related to planning, risk-taking, and consensus-building. 
In a business-unit level analysis using the data on technology-intensive firms, 
Galbraith and Merrill (1991) explored the impact of compensation program and structure 
on SBU competitive strategy. One of the intriguing results with respect to structure is 
that delegation can be either positive or negative depending on the contents of decisions 
delegated. In the case of R&D-related decisions, delegations to lower levels help in-
vestment in R&D activities or capital equipment, whereas delegations of non-R&D-
related decisions don’t. But centralization of non-R&D decisions helps control the level 
of technology/product quality.  
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In summary, organizational structure affects the way strategy is made both in the 
firm and business-unit levels. This is because organizational structure dictates the flow 
and interpretation of information and the way organizational participants interact with 
one another in the organization. 
 
Organizational structure, business-unit strategy, performance 
 
Based on the arguments of contingency theory, Hill and Hoskisson (1987) argue 
that different diversification strategies are related to different economic benefits. 
According to them, to realize economic benefits, a different diversification strategy 
should fit with appropriate organizational structure and control mechanisms. In other 
words structure moderates diversification strategy and firm performance. Hill, et al. 
(1992) tested the theoretical arguments proposed by Hill and Hoskisson (1987). Using 
data from 184 large firms, they found that firms pursuing economic benefits from scope 
economies (related diversification) perform better when their organizational structure 
and control mechanisms facilitate cooperation among business units, whereas firms 
geared to realize benefits from governance economies (unrelated diversification) better 
perform when their organizational arrangements stress competition among units. 
Several scholars explored the implications of organizational structure and strat-
egy on performance at business unit levels. On the relationship between decentralization 
and the effectiveness of strategic business units, Govindarajan (1986) proposed that, in 
order to enhance an SBU’s effectiveness, the degree of decentralization of decision-
making authority delegated to the general manager of the SBU should be closely aligned 
with the SBU’s strategy. Specifically he proposes that when SBU’s mission is ‘build’ 
(SBU is focused on gaining market share often at the expense of short-term profitability 
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and cash flow), decentralization leads to high SBU effectiveness, whereas the mission is 
‘harvest’ (to maximize short-term profits and cash flow, often sacrificing market share), 
centralization leads to high SBU effectiveness. In addition to build-harvest continuum, 
he used Porter’s (1980) differentiation-low cost strategy and Miles and Snow’s (1978) 
prospector-defender typology to explore the relationship between centralization-
decentralization and SBU effectiveness. He proposes that the combination of differentia-
tion and prospect strategies and decentralization leads to high SBU effectiveness, 
whereas low cost and defender strategies with centralization lead to high SBU effective-
ness. 
Using the survey from the general managers of 58 SBUs of 8 firms, Gupta (1987) 
tested Govindarajan’s (1986) arguments. Specifically, Gupta (1987) examined the mod-
erating role of SBU’s strategic contexts (strategic mission and competitive strategy) on 
the performance implications of three aspects of corporate-SBU relations. These three 
aspects are (1) openness in corporate-SBU relationship; (2) subjective assessment of 
SBU performance by corporate headquarters; and (3) corporate-SBU decentralization. 
The results show that SBUs pursuing differentiation strategy (low-cost) or market share 
(short-term profits), openness in corporate-SBU relationship and subjectivity in per-
formance assessment were positively (negatively) associated with SBU effectiveness. In 
contrast, corporate-SBU decentralization was found to positively affect SBUs’ effective-
ness regardless of SBUs’ strategic contexts. 
The above study, however, did not differentiate the kinds of functions and activi-
ties that should be in the purview of the individual SBU (Golden, 1992). For example, 
prior research did focus on “decentralization” as a whole, but did not pay attention on 
SBUs’ functions or activities that are the target of decentralization. Based on this criti-
cism, Golden (1992) hypothesized that SBUs yield high performance when they control 
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the functions and activities most central to its strategy and avoid controlling peripheral 
functions or activities (e.g., SBUs with external strategic orientation control environ-
mental monitoring activities and strategic decision analysis). The analysis from the sur-
vey administered to the hospital CEO and data including 496 SBUs supports the notion. 
One of the important aspects of multibusiness firms is that business units in the 
same firm share resources with one another. Gupta and Govindarajan (1986) addressed 
the situation where resource sharing among SBUs is desirable and its implications. The 
results show that (1) the utility of resource sharing is a function of an SBU’s competitive 
strategy (e.g., for SBUs pursuing low cost strategy, resource sharing is beneficial); (2) 
incentive systems for general managers of SBUs depend on the magnitude of resource 
sharing (e.g., the higher the resource sharing is, the better subjective evaluation is for 
performance); and (3) resource sharing has a negative effect on the job satisfaction of 
general managers partly due to the loss of control. 
In summary, most of the relevant studies have not directly investigated how or-
ganizational structure affects firms’ strategies or strategic behaviors. Regardless of the 
levels of analysis, they have either focused on the direct effect of organizational struc-
ture on performance, or investigating the moderating role of strategy on the relationship 
between organizational structure and performance from the perspective of contingency 
theory. Starting from the next chapter, we will address how organizational structure af-
fects firms’ strategic behavior in the context of product location choice. 
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CHAPTER III 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Introduction 
 
In Chapter II I reviewed some of the existing literature on product differentiation 
and organizational structure. Despite its prevalence and importance as an outcome or 
means of firms’ competitive actions in the product market, product location choice has 
not received sufficient attention from strategic management scholars. And research that 
explicitly explores the implication of a firm’s structural arrangement on that firm’s com-
petitive outcome is rare. Based on this recognition, this study addresses product location 
choice from the perspective of the firms that have multidivisional (M-form) structure. As 
a way to link a firm’s multidivisional structure to that firm’s decision on product loca-
tion choice, this study relies on the literature on M-form structure, status, product differ-
entiation, competitive dynamics, and product cannibalization.  
This chapter presents a theory and testable hypotheses for the study. To this end 
this chapter is organized as follows. First, this chapter starts with some basic notions 
about the M-form. Here the study addresses the rationale for the adoption of the M-form 
and divisional domains or charters. Regarding the adoption of the M-form, I address (1) 
Chandler’s (1995[1962]) documentation on the basic characteristics of the M-form, Wil-
liamson’s (1975, 1985) transaction cost approach to the M-form adoption and its cri-
tique; and (2) recent developments in IO economics on divisionalization and firms’ 
product market competition, which provide some implications of M-form adoption on 
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product location choice. And based on the implications, a conceptual model of the study 
is presented. 
Second, this study addresses the role of the status of a division on that division’s 
product location choice. Each division is supposed to have its own status that is deter-
mined by each division’s relative position in the economic, political, and prestige hierar-
chies among divisions in the same firm. Based on the sociological literature on status, 
this study argues that a higher-status division would garner more resources and have 
more discretion over its behaviors, which would lead the division to exhibit different be-
haviors in product location choice than lower-status divisions.  
Third, this study explores the impact of divisional domain overlap between a fo-
cal division and rival divisions of competing firms (inter-firm divisional domain overlap) 
on the focal division’s product location choice. Based on the arguments of niche overlap 
and competitive dynamics, this study argues that the magnitude of a focal division’s do-
main overlap with a rival division, proportional to this focal division’s own domain, 
would affect the focal division’s product location choice. Specifically, the study suggests 
that a division with higher degree of domain overlap with a rival division, proportional 
to its own domain, would be more aggressive and consequently is more likely to locate 
its new products closer to that rival’s products. 
Fourth, this study deals with divisional domain overlap between a focal division 
and another division of the same firm (intra-firm divisional domain overlap) and its im-
pact on the focal division’s product location choice. Here I argue that firms have incen-
tives to reduce the level of internal competition among divisions, and consequently divi-
sions would work toward reducing internal competition when they introduce new prod-
ucts. Due to an asymmetric effect of divisional domain overlap, this study expects that a 
division with a higher level of intra-firm divisional domain overlap, proportional to its 
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own divisional domain, would have more incentives to locate its new product farther 
away from other divisions’ products.    
 
Divisionalization and New Product Location Choice 
 
Analogous to firm’s profit maximizing behavior, we could assume that a division 
tries to maximize its profits by selling its own products in the market. This would also be 
the case when it introduces a new product into the market. Profits from the new product 
could be broken down to four pieces according to their sources (cf. Traylor, 1986; Tho-
mas and Weigelt, 2000). 
 
Additional Profits from a New Product = Profits from market expansion + Profits 
taken from competitors’ products + Profits taken from sister divisions’ products 
+ profits taken from its own division’s products 
 
First, profits from a new product could come from market expansion. By reach-
ing beyond a current customer base through a new product introduction, a division could 
increase its profits. This could be the ideal situation for a division in the sense that it can 
increase its revenue or profits without aggravating its competitors. Second, a new prod-
uct could contribute to a division by taking sales from competing products. A division 
may not necessarily expand market per se through a new product introduction, but it will 
definitely increase the revenue and profits. Third, a division’s new product could take 
sales from the products offered by the division’s sister divisions that belong to the same 
firm. In this case, the focal division’s revenue and profits would increase, but unlike the 
previous two cases, firm profits may suffer. This portion of profits comes from inter-
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divisional product cannibalization. And fourth, a division’s new product could take sales 
from its own division’s products. In this case, the focal division’s own profits could suf-
fer unless the new product yields more profits than cannibalized products. This portion 
of profits basically is due to intra-divisional product cannibalization. 
The magnitude of the last three terms at the right-hand-side of the equation 
would be decided, at least in part, by the product features of a new product vis-à-vis 
competing products, the products of sister divisions, and the products of its own divi-
sion. For example, low product differentiation with respect to rival products would 
surely increase competition, which would in turn increase the sales or profits at stake. 
And low product differentiation with respect to the products of sister divisions would in-
crease the potential profits or revenues from inter-divisional cannibalization. 
Here this study argues that a division’s decision on the product features of its 
new product vis-à-vis competing products, the products of sister divisions, and its own 
products would be affected by the division’s structural relationships vis-à-vis competing 
divisions and sister divisions as well as by the corporate headquarters. Competitive pres-
sures from certain structural relationships with rival divisions or sister divisions could 
affect the focal division’s new product location choice vis-à-vis these divisions’ prod-
ucts. I argue that this phenomenon of structural relationships that the focal division has 
could be captured by the notion of divisionalization. 
 
Divisionalization 
 
Organizational structure refers to internal differentiation and patterns of relation-
ships among major components (e.g., departments, divisions) of a complex organization 
(Thompson, 1967). In general, internal differentiation consists of vertical differentiation 
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and horizontal differentiation.3 From this perspective, divisionalization and subsequent 
multidivisional structure basically refers to the internal differentiation characterized with 
general office and divisions (vertical differentiation) and division(s) – division(s) (hori-
zontal differentiation), and patterns of relationships among these major components. 
Thus this study addresses how divisionalization and consequent internal differentiation 
and patterns of relationships affect product location choice. As an initial step toward this 
end, let us start with the basic notion of division and divisional domain. 
 
Division and divisional domain 
A firm has its own domain that is characterized with (1) population (i.e., custom-
ers) served; (2) products and services rendered to the population; and (3) technology that 
is necessary in rendering products and services to the population (Thompson, 1967). 
And a firm usually has multiple contingencies around its domain. Therefore firms seek-
ing rationality “cluster capacities into self-sufficient units, each equipped with the full 
array of resources necessary for the organization to meet contingencies” (Thompson, 
1967: 78). In this regard horizontal differentiation through divisionalization may be un-
derstood as an attempt for a firm to let its multiple divisions handle these multiple con-
tingencies that the firm is faced with. As mentioned in Chapter I, here division refers to 
operating divisions, not supporting divisions such as human resources or finance. 
Since each division is supposed to handle a part of the contingencies of the firm 
to which the division belongs, it should have its own domain that is in turn a portion of 
the firm’s domain. Divisional charter or domain is “the businesses (i.e., product and 
market arenas) in which a division actively participate and for which it is responsible 
within the corporation” (Galunic and Eisenhardt, 1996: 256). Since this study concerns 
                                                
3 In addition to these two types of differentiation, Hall (1999) adds geographical dispersion. 
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product location choice that is about choosing the characteristics of a new product, it 
would better serve the purpose of the current study to define divisional domain using the 
notion of product characteristics. If we assume that all products can be sufficiently rep-
resented as combinations of different values of n common characteristics, then we can 
locate a product as a point in an n-dimensional product characteristics space. And if a 
division offers k products, then we can locate the products of this division by k points in 
an n-dimensional space. Thus when a division offers k products that are combinations of 
different values of n common characteristics, the divisional domain of this division could 
be defined as the multidimensional area inside k points in an n-dimensional product 
characteristics space. Depending upon the contingencies that a division is supposed to 
handle, the domain of the division could change over time through charter gains or 
losses (Galunic and Eisenhardt, 1996, 2000).4   
If we assume that we can represent the characteristics of a product as a scalar 
value on one-dimensional space, divisional domains could be depicted as shown in Fig-
ure 3.1 (See Appendix A). This figure depicts the divisional charters of GM and Ford 
Motor Co. in 1992. The product market is split on the basis of market segment (from 
left, lower small car, middle small car, … , luxury sport car) and the size shaded areas of 
each division along the product characteristics space represent each division’s magnitude 
of presence in the corresponding market segments. So the area that each division occu-
pies represents its divisional domain and for which it is responsible within the firm.   
In the above, the study mainly has focused on divisionalization based on the 
product market. In addition to this product-based divisionalization, the firm could divi-
                                                
4 Divisional domain can be defined based on other criteria. A case in point is GM when it reorganized it-
self in the early 1920s. GM defined divisional boundaries on the basis of price so that each division has its 
own price range (domain or charter) and ideally one division’s price range would not overlap with those of 
other divisions: Cadillac sold in the highest-priced position, Buick the next, then Oakland, and then Olds, 
and finally Chevrolet in the lowest-priced market (Chandler, 1995[1962]). 
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sionalize on the basis of customers or geographic regions. With respect to customer-
based divisionalization, the firm might have two divisions: one covers individual cus-
tomers whereas the other serves business customers. This customer-based divisionaliza-
tion could be equally depicted by a kind of figure introduced just before. This time the 
dimension should be customer segment, not segments based on product characteristics. 
In this case the overlap could be easily observed in the area where individual customers 
and business customers meet. Generally small-sized businesses could operate using 
equipment or services that are originally tuned for individual customers (e.g., computer 
industry). But the current notion of product-based divisional domain may not fully ac-
commodate the case where the firm divisionalizes on the basis of geographic regions and 
each region-based division covers a full range of products offered by the firm.  
 
Divisional domain and product location choice 
With respect to divisional domain, a division could have three options in locating 
its new product. First, a division could locate its new product either close to or far away 
from its current products or divisional domain. The closer the location of a new product, 
the division could better exploit its existing capabilities but the chances of cannibalizing 
its own products would increase, whereas the farther away the location, the division 
needs more resources but the chances of cannibalization (i.e., intra-divisional cannibali-
zation) would decrease. Second, a division could locate its new product either close to or 
far away from the divisional domains other divisions of the same firm. The closer (or 
farther) the location, the chances of inter-divisional cannibalization would increase (or 
decrease). And third, a division could locate its new product either close to or far away 
from the divisional domains of rival divisions. The closer (or farther) the location to rival 
divisions’ domains, the competition between the focal division and rival divisions would 
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increase (or decrease). Thus, the location choice of a new product by a focal division 
could be influenced by factors idiosyncratic to the focal division, factors on the relation-
ship between a focal division and other divisions of the same firm, and factors relevant 
to the relationship between a focal division and its rival divisions in the product market. 
In this regard, prior studies on divisionalization provide some implications. 
 
General office and divisions 
In addition to divisional domains or charters, another peculiar characteristic of 
multidivisional structure is the existence of general office and its role. General office 
was created from the need to alleviate the administrative load on executive officers. In 
this respect, Chandler (1995[1962]) argue that M-form structure is a creative innovation 
to handle the situation when the administrative load on executive officers reached to 
such an extent that they could not execute their entrepreneurial responsibilities effi-
ciently. According to him, the success of multidivisional structure resides in the separa-
tion between entrepreneurial actions/decisions and operating actions/decisions, and 
states the different roles between top team generalists and division managers as follow 
(Chandler, 1995[1962], 309-311). 
 
The basic reason for its success was simply that it clearly removed the 
executives responsible for the destiny of the entire enterprise from the 
more routine operational activities and so gave them the time, informa-
tion, and even psychological commitment for long-term planning and ap-
praisal. … Thus the new structure left the broad strategic decisions as to 
the allocation of existing resources and the acquisition of new ones in the 
hands of a top team generalists. … In this way, the new structure left eh 
divisional executives to run the business, while the general officers set the 
goals and policies and provided over-all appraisal. The division manag-
ers, responsible for the functional activities of their units, made decisions 
about prices charged on specific products, about design and quality of the 
existing products and the development of new ones, about more immedi-
ate markets and marketing, about probable resources of supply, about 
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technological improvements, and finally about the flow of product from 
supplier to consumer. But these decisions were to be made within the 
framework set by the broad policy guides and financial budgets through 
which the general executives determined the present and future allocation 
of resources of the enterprise as a whole and within the carefully defined 
interrelationships between the operating units and the general office as 
indicated by the company’s structure. (Italics added) 
 
Extended from Chandler (1995[1962]), Williamson (1975, 1985) focuses on the 
transaction cost minimizing properties of the M-form, which became possible due to the 
separation of two distinctive roles mentioned above. He presents a succinct summary of 
the role of general office under optimum divisionalization. According to him, the func-
tion of the general office under optimum divisionalization (i.e., under so-called ‘pure’ 
M-form structure) involves: (1) the identification of separable economic activities within 
the firm; (2) according quasi-autonomous standing (usually of a profit center nature) to 
each; (3) monitoring the efficiency performance of each division; (4) awarding incen-
tives; (5) allocating cash flows to high-yield uses; and (6) performing strategic planning 
(diversification, acquisition, divestiture, and related activities) in other respects (Wil-
liamson, 1975: 149). In sum, what is innovative of the M-form is that general executives 
are relieved from operational actions and decisions, and focus on two major roles: stra-
tegic planning and resource allocation, and monitoring divisional performance using a 
control apparatus, which ultimately leads to minimize transaction costs.  
Focusing on two main roles of general executives of the M-form, Williamson 
(1975, 1985) further argues that the M-form provides a frictionless miniature capital 
market inside the firm. An external capital market easily fails to work due to information 
asymmetry and lack of an effective control apparatus on the part of investors. But, 
within the M-form, general executives play the role of profit-maximizing investors, and 
unlike external investors, they are not disadvantaged in terms of information asymmetry 
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and have a control apparatus at hand to discipline division managers. Thus M-form has 
the transaction cost minimizing properties, which is why the M-form is superior to the 
U-form (M-Form Hypothesis).  
The Williamsonian approach to the M-form, represented by M-form hypothesis, 
however, is not without critiques. A thorough critique was provided by Hill (1985). He 
criticizes this theory on three grounds: (1) the assumption of external capital market fail-
ure may not hold any more due to the increased efficiency of an external capital market; 
(2) general executives do not necessarily act as profit-maximizing investors, which is 
what agency theory posits; and (3) an M-form control apparatus may trigger potentially 
serious problems such as risk-aversion and short-run profit-maximizing behavior on the 
part of division managers.5  
Pure multidivisional structure (M-form) could be further broken into two sub-
categories: type D1 that is a highly integrated M-form enterprise offering differentiated 
but otherwise common final products; and type D2 that offers diversified final products 
or services.6 Here we are concerned with type D1. This type of M-form needs a more ex-
tensive control apparatus to manage spillover effects.  
Regarding resource allocation, the above approach to divisionalization and con-
sequent adoption multidivisional structure (Chandler, 1995[1962]; Williamson, 1975, 
1985) begs a question: Would general office allocate resources to its divisions solely 
based on objective performance data of each division? Ideally general office in the mul-
                                                
5 For more detailed documentation on the critiques about Williamson’s (1975, 1985) conception of the M-
form, readers are referred to Hoskisson, Hill, and Kim (1993). 
6 In addition to pure M-form, Williamson (1975) presents two other M-form structures: transitional 
multidivisional (M´-form) and corrupted multidivisional ( M -form). Transitional multidivisional is the M-
form enterprise that is in the process of adjustment toward pure M-form. And corrupted multidivisional is 
a multidivisional structure in which a control apparatus is provided but general executives are extensively 
involved in divisions’ operating affairs. In sum, M-form structure itself is not one dimensional and has 
several variants. 
   
  
44
tidivisional structure should be able to allocate resources to each division depending on 
each division’s potential for future performance. Prior studies, however, argued that 
when corporate headquarters allocate resources to a division, they don’t do this solely on 
the basis of its potential for future performance, but rather on the basis of prior perform-
ances or a division’s significance in the firm (Simon, 1997; Cyert and March, 1963). 
This is partly because of bounded rationality of corporate headquarters due to an uncer-
tain external environment, and difficulties in perfectly measuring divisional perform-
ances which may be more complicated with spillover effects between divisions.  
With respect to resource allocation contingent upon structural arrangement of the 
firm, Bower (1970) provides another insight. He argues that organizational structure in-
fluences definition and impetus processes of investment as well as business planning 
process. In other words, structural context affects the pressure from the inside by dictat-
ing the way a project is defined and pushed upward for resources and support. Thus 
structural shift can influence how an investment opportunity is conceived at the division 
and corporate levels (Bower, 1970: 296). 
 
Structure can be changed to change the way in which opportunity is per-
ceived and projects evaluated. In addition, structural shifts can be used to 
broaden the concept of the opportunity for useful influence among man-
agers at the division and process levels of the company. (Italics added)  
 
Thus, we can expect that there may be room that a division can influence re-
source allocation for its favor. Here the study argues that divisional status would play a 
role in resource allocation. The literature on status suggests that status matters partly be-
cause it is a signal or information that reduces the uncertainty involved in market trans-
actions (e.g., Podolny, 1993, 1994; Benjamin and Podolny, 1999), interorganizational re-
lations (Chung, Singh, and Lee, 2000) or technology diffusion (Podolny and Stuart, 
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1995), or allocating grants (Pfeffer, Salancik, and Leblebci, 1976). And because of the 
uncertainty-reducing property of status, higher-status holders earn more resources from 
customers and consequently more profits, form more alliances with higher-status part-
ners, or garner more grants than lower-status holders. This suggests that a higher-status 
division would be more likely to receive favorable treatment from corporate headquar-
ters and garner more resources than lower-status divisions in the same firm. And more 
resources would allow the higher-status division to experiment with new products with 
improved features or quality (cf. Schumpeter, 1934), which further indicates that higher-
status divisions would exhibit different behaviors in product location choice than lower-
status divisions. This is the first issue that I will address later regarding divisions’ prod-
uct location choices.  
 
Multiple divisions and competition in the product market 
Up to now I have addressed the adoption of the M-form from the perspective of 
the separation between general executives’ entrepreneurial actions/decisions and divi-
sion managers’ operating actions/decisions (Chandler, 1995[1962]), and consequent 
transaction cost minimizing properties of the M-form (Williamson, 1975, 1985), which 
ultimately makes the M-form efficient. In addition to this, some of the IO economics 
scholars have addressed why divisionalization is more profitable than remaining as a 
unified whole from the perspective of competition in the product markets (e.g., Corchon, 
1991; Schwartz and Thompson, 1986; Veendorp, 1991; Polasky, 1992; Baye, Crocker, 
and Ju, 1996a, 1996b). Basically they argue that through divisionalization firms can ei-
ther deter entry or achieve Stackelberg leadership in the product market, which may ul-
timately makes divisionalization more profitable than operating as a unified whole. 
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First, firms have incentives to deter entry through divisionalization. In an oligop-
oly market, incumbent firms set up new divisions to preempt entry (Schwartz and 
Thompson, 1986). According to them, divisionalization for preemption always domi-
nates noninnovative entry, which ensures that incumbents in oligopolistic industries 
forestall all entry by noninnovative potential entrants. This is because independent and 
competing divisions would perfectly emulate the behaviors of potential entrants and 
thereby forestall a noninnovative entrant.7 Extended from Schwartz and Thompson 
(1986), Veendorp (1991) argues that creating sufficient numbers of independent divi-
sions or operating centers can deter entry. And with respect to the potential negative im-
pact of the divisions’ independent actions (e.g., competing against each other) on overall 
firm profitability, Veendorp (1991) contends that prior investment in division-specific 
capital can limit the negative impact. 
Second, through divisionalization, firms can achieve Stackelberg leadership in 
the product market. Corchon (1991) argues that large firms have incentives to create 
several independent divisions that compete in the same market as a credible commitment 
to Stackelberg leadership of the firms. Baye, et al. (1996b) demonstrate that, in a two-
stage game, setting up autonomous competing units (stage one) that behave independent 
from profit maximizers allows a parent firm to commit unilaterally to a greater level of 
output (stage two), thereby mimicking a Stackelberg-type outcome in the product mar-
ket. Therefore, oligopolistic producers have the unilateral incentive to divisionalize and 
increase firm profits. In a similar two-stage model, Polasky (1992) argues that it is more 
profitable for the firm to form (completely) independent competing divisions rather than 
                                                
7 Schwartz and Thompson (1986) argue that entry-forestalling divisionalization would occur in exception-
ally profitable, oligopolistic industries. They also provide some examples:  GM’s reorganization in the 
early 1970s due to low profits after the entry of Japanese car makers; Seagram’s recentralization in the 
1980s due to low demand and low threat of entry; and P&G’s divisionalization due to high profits.  
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to remain as a unified whole, because independent divisions will act independently to 
each other, which will result in making the firm more aggressive and induce rival firms 
to be less aggressive when output decisions are made (in stage two). In sum, forming in-
dependent rival divisions is more profitable than remaining as a unified whole because 
divisionalization allows the divisionalized firm to deter entry and to achieve Stackelberg 
leadership. 
Then should this kind of divisionalization be the prescription for every multipro-
duct firm? Here the study presents two considerations that should be included in answer-
ing this question: (1) the formation of rival divisions by competing firms; and (2) inter-
dependencies among divisions of the same firm. First, we should consider the situation 
where a focal firm with multidivisional structure competes with other firms that also 
have multiple divisions. The IO economics literature on divisionalization assumes that a 
focal firm faces with single-division competitors. However, this is rather an exception. 
For example, major players in computer manufacturing industry such as Dell and HP 
have multiple divisions that cover different types of products (e.g., products for busi-
nesses or consumers) or geographical regions. In this respect, Polasky (1992) argues that 
the results may not hold when firms in an industry form multiple divisions and compete 
against each other using their respective divisions. This poses a problem in directly ap-
plying the arguments of the current literature to divisions’ product location choices. We 
need to incorporate the reality that both a focal firm and competing firms have multiple 
divisions. 
Here the study argues that we need to pay attention to the way a focal firm posi-
tions its divisions along the product markets vis-à-vis its competing firms. As shown in 
Figure 3.1, two competing firms could split the same product market differently in terms 
of the number of divisions or divisional domains. Each division has its own divisional 
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domain; and confronts with different sets of rival divisions of competing firms, depend-
ing on the location of its domain along the product market. Note that this study is con-
cerned with an industry offering differentiated products, and consequently, cross-
elasticity between products decreases as the distance between products increases (Gab-
szewicz, 1999; Schmalensee, 1978, 1985). This suggests that rival divisions that a focal 
division actively competes with should be those whose divisional domains overlap with 
that of the focal division. The literature on organizational ecology (e.g., Hannan and 
Freeman, 1989; Podolny and Stuart, 1995; McPherson, 1983) and competitive dynamics 
(e.g., Chen, 1996; Baum and Korn, 1996) suggests that the same amount of absolute 
niche overlap or market domain overlap between two competitors poses an asymmetric 
competitive threat to them depending on the importance of the overlapped portion to 
each firm. Thus, this study expects that the degree of divisional overlap between a focal 
division and rival divisions would matter when it chooses the location of its new prod-
uct. Specifically this study predicts that the higher the degree of divisional domain over-
lap between a focal division and its rival divisions (relative to the focal division’s do-
main), the focal division will be more aggressive, which will be reflected in the focal di-
vision’s product location choice of its new product. 
Second, we should also take into account the internal relationship among divi-
sions of the same firm when we look into divisions’ competitive activities including 
product location choices. Most IO studies on divisionalization have assumed that inde-
pendent divisions compete with one another as much as they compete with other firms. 
And we may say that the mechanism that has driven many of these models of division-
alization in IO economics is the strategic effect of inter-divisional cannibalization by 
which the divisionalized firm becomes more aggressive (consequently rival firms be-
come less aggressive at the 2nd stage according to a 2-stage game) and be able to deter 
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entry. However, the flip side of this driving mechanism of divisionalization is that the 
tendency to avoid inter-divisional cannibalization may make firms and consequently 
their divisions less likely to be competitively aggressive against one another. Some re-
cent studies on divisionalization in IO economics point out the tendency to avoid canni-
balization. 
Some recent IO studies on divisionalization suggest that divisions do not neces-
sarily engage in intense competition with other divisions of the same firm when there is 
the possibility that firms renegotiate unobservable contracts with their divisions (Had-
field, 1991; Corts and Neher, 1999). In a similar context, Corts (2001) found that the 
multiple divisions of a studio act more like an integrated firm in that they schedule the 
films that are jointly distributed and produced by other divisions of the same studio more 
efficiently than the films from purely competing divisions of other studios. And general 
office has the means to influence the behaviors of divisions so that overall organizational 
performance could increase. For example, corporate headquarters could facilitate coop-
eration among divisions by using appropriate incentives (Hill, et al., 1992).  
Thus, it is very hard to expect that divisions of the same firm would be allowed 
to compete with each other, at least, as intensively as they do against rival divisions. 
This study further expects that a focal division would try not to pose a competitive threat 
to other divisions of the same firm voluntarily or pressured by corporate headquarters. 
Here a competitive threat that a focal division poses to another division of the same firm 
is conceptualized as the divisional domain overlap between the focal division and the 
other one. And the study also expects that competitive asymmetry will hold. Specifi-
cally, this study predicts that a division with a higher degree of divisional overlap (i.e., 
overlapped portion means more to this division than the other one) would be feel more 
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competitive pressure from this overlap, and try to alleviate the pressure by decreasing 
the overlap, which would be reflected in the division’s new product location choice. 
 
A conceptual model for the study 
 
Figure 3.2 presents a conceptual model for the study. The model depicts the ef-
fects of divisionalization on product location choice from a division’s perspective. As 
shown in the figure, this study focuses on three aspects of divisionalization that were 
presented in the previous section: the status of a division, inter-firm divisional domain 
overlap, and intra-firm divisional domain overlap (See Appendix A).    
The conceptual model depicts that the status of a division influences the distance 
between a new product of a division and this division’s existing products. And industry-
wide uncertainty moderates the relationship between divisional status and product loca-
tion choice. Second, the model shows that a focal division’s inter-firm divisional domain 
overlap (i.e., divisional domain overlap between a focal division and a rival division) 
would affect how closely the focal division locates its new product vis-à-vis the products 
of a rival division. And this posited relationship would vary depending on how crowded 
the focal division’s domain is. Third, the model suggests that a focal division’s intra-firm 
divisional domain overlap (i.e., divisional domain overlap between a focal division and 
another division of the same firm) has an impact on how closely or farther way the focal 
division locates its new product vis-à-vis the products of the overlap division of the same 
firm. In addition, the model specifies several other moderating effects. From now on I 
present the hypotheses. 
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Divisional Status and New Product Location Choice 
 
Before addressing divisional status, let us talk about the status of an individual 
and then the status a firm. The status of an individual refers to the relative position that 
the individual occupies within a hierarchy (Benoit-Smullyan, 1944).8 Benoit-Smullyan 
(1944) suggests three chief hierarchies that are fundamental in defining the status of an 
individual: the economic hierarchy, the political hierarchy, and the prestige hierarchy. 
Thus, an individual’s relative position within these three hierarchies constitutes her eco-
nomic status, political status, and prestige status. These three forms of status are corre-
lated with one another in that they reinforce one another, but at the same time each one 
is distinct from one another. These three forms of status of an individual as whole consti-
tute the social status of that individual.  
At the organizational level Podolny (1993) provides another definition of status 
in his status-based model of market competition. In the context of market, he defines a 
producer’s status as “the perceived quality of that producer’s products in relation to the 
perceived quality of that producer’s competitors’ products” (Podolny, 1993: 830). This 
status-based model of market competition suggests that a producer’s status mainly 
comes from two sources: a producer’s past demonstrations of good quality and the status 
of its exchange partners (Podolny, 1993, 1994; Podolny and Stuart, 1995; Benjamin and 
Podolny, 1999; Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels, 1999). The former source is similar to what 
an economics model of reputation has argued: past quality is an important source of in-
                                                
8 Related to the definition of status, Benoit-Smullyan (1944: 151) defines hierarchy and hierarchical posi-
tion as follows: “By a hierarchy we mean a number of individuals ordered on an inferiority-superiority 
scale with respect to the comparative degree to which they possess or embody some socially approved or 
generally desired attribute or characteristic. A hierarchical position is always a position in which one indi-
vidual is identified with others with regard to the possession or embodiment of some common characteris-
tic, but differentiated from these others in the degree, or measure, to which that characteristic is possessed 
or embodied.” (Italics are original) 
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formation (i.e., signal) about the current quality of a product (Shapiro, 1983). What is 
distinctive about this is the second source that emphasizes the role of affiliations (or ties) 
of actors in a network of relations. 
Analogous to Benoit-Smullyan (1944), the status of a division or divisional status 
is defined as the relative position of that division in a firm with respect to economic, po-
litical, and prestige hierarchies. Here hierarchies are defined among the divisions of the 
same firm. Then where does economic status come from? Sociological literature sug-
gests that one of the sources for an individual is her income level relative to other people 
in the community (Weber, 1968; Benoit-Smullyan, 1944). This may suggest that a divi-
sion’s economic status comes from its past economic performance and contribution to 
firm performance. And a division’s political status may come from the division’s rela-
tionship with corporate executives who are responsible for resource allocation and in-
vestment approval, such as a CEO or a board of directors. And prestigious status may 
come from the quality of products (e.g., Cadillac Division). 
Status matters because it affects a status holder’s behavior. Prior studies on status 
provide ample evidence at the individual, group, and organizational levels. At the indi-
vidual level, studies show that status determines evaluations of and performance-
expectations for group members, and hence the distribution of participation, influence, 
and prestige at a later stage (Berger, Cohen, and Zelditch, 1972); higher-status subjects 
(teachers) claim more space with their bodies, talked more, attempted more interrup-
tions, and more frequently intruded upon their partners than lower-status subjects (stu-
dents) (Leffler, Gillespie, and Conaty, 1982); and initial status differences make differ-
ent influence patterns at a later stage regardless of their relevance on the task at hand 
(Moore, 1968, 1969). At the group level, Manheim (1960) demonstrated that the status 
differences between two groups are positively related to the level of conflicts between 
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them. And at the organizational level, an organization’s own status has a positive impact 
on market outcomes such as life chances of organizations (Podolny, Stuart, and Hannan, 
1996); the spread between costs and price in the investment banking industry (Podolny, 
1993); influence over the direction of technological innovation in the semiconductor in-
dustry (Podolny and Stuart, 1995); the reactions of the financial community with respect 
to initial public offerings (Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels, 1999); choice on product quality 
and the returns from producing a given quality in the California wine industry (Benjamin 
and Podolny, 1999). And studies also show that firms with similar status are more likely 
to form alliances in the U.S. investment banking industry (Chung, et al., 2000) and en-
gage in transactions in investment banking (Podolny, 1994). 
So we expect that the status of a division may also affect the division’s behavior 
including its product location choice. Status matters in transactions in the market be-
cause status reduces the uncertainty about the quality of products or services (Podolny, 
1993, 1994; Benjamin and Podolny, 1999) or the prospect of new technology (Podolny 
and Stuart, 1995). If firms or consumers are certain about quality or the outcome of new 
technological innovation, they would not rely on status as a means to minimize uncer-
tainty (cf. Podolny, 1993). Here I argue that the status of a division matters primarily be-
cause the status of a division reduces the uncertainty involved in resource allocation on 
the hand of corporate headquarters. 
One of the primary characteristics of multidivisional structure is that corporate 
headquarters allocate or reallocate resources to high-yield uses (Chandler, 1995[1962]; 
Williamson, 1975, 1985). However, it is very hard to figure out the presumed perform-
ance of a certain investment project or proposal by divisions (Walton, 1997; Cyert and 
March, 1992). Here is why the resource allocation among subunits such as divisions is 
“quite sensitive to past experience, to the experience of comparable subunits, and to the 
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prima facie relevance of the subunit to other parts of the organization” (Cyert and 
March, 1992: 184). In the case of project funding, firms allocate resources on the basis 
of historical legitimacy, current organizational emphasis, and presumed performance 
(Cyert and March, 1992). Thus we expect that firms may be more likely to allocate re-
sources primarily to divisions that have shown good economic performance in the past 
and consequently have higher economic status and prestige status. In other words, allo-
cating resources to a higher status division would be a more credible investment than to 
a lower status division. 
In addition to economic status, the political status of a division would also help a 
higher status division secure more resources than a lower status division. Status is one of 
the sources of power (Weber, 1968), and political status especially is closely related to 
power (Benoit-Smullyan, 1944). With respect to power, resource dependence theory also 
suggests that when an organization provides resources to other organizations for re-
sources, the organization exercises power over those organizations (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978). A division with high economic status would bring in resources (e.g., cash flows) 
that may be reallocated to other divisions by corporate headquarters. So we may expect 
that the division may exercise power over other divisions.  
With respect to resource allocation among subunits, politics and power play an 
important role (Cyert and March, 1992; Simon, 1997; Bower, 1970) because of the con-
flicting interests of the subunits and the scarcity of resources. Arrow (1974) argues that 
when subunits have the same information but different interests over the information, the 
conflicts among the subunits could be solved by bargaining among involved parties. 
Thus we can expect the conflicts would be solved in favor a subunit with higher bargain-
ing power over other subunits involved. This suggests that when a new investment op-
portunity emerges and several divisions vie for the opportunity and necessary resources, 
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a higher status division is more likely to win over the contest for resource allocation, if 
other things be equal. 
More resources may allow a higher status division to experiment with new prod-
ucts that are quite different from their current product lines in terms of product features 
or product quality. But for a lower status division that is at a disadvantage in securing re-
sources, the chances of investing in a new product that is quite different from their cur-
rent product lines would be very low. So it may be more likely to focus on maintaining 
its current product lines. In sum, higher status divisions can have means to develop 
products that are different from their current product lines compared with lower status 
divisions.   
In addition, a higher status division also has incentives to keep up its in terms of 
quality or variety of product features. Prior studies show that firms have incentives not to 
lower the quality of their products that may harm their status in the market (Benjamin 
and Podolny, 1999; Podolny, 1993). And Christensen (1997) demonstrates that firms 
that have pioneered in developing new products are more interested in constantly en-
hancing the performance of their products by focusing on developing technology that is 
sustaining in nature. This may suggest that a higher status division is motivated to en-
hance its status by enhancing its products.  
In sum, higher-status divisions are more likely to have credibility in terms of 
successful investment from corporate headquarters, have power to prevail over other di-
visions in the case of conflicting interests among them, and motivation to develop new 
products that are better than previous products and would sustain their current status. 
These arguments lead to the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 1. The higher the status of a division is, the greater the dis-
tance between that division’s new product and its existing products. 
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It was mentioned that status matters in market transaction, technology adoption, 
or alliance formations, because it reduces uncertainty inherent in these actions (e.g., Po-
dolny, 1993, 1994; Podolny and Stuart, 1995; Chung, et al., 2000). In a similar vein, 
Pfeffer, et al. (1976) also showed that when uncertainty is high (i.e., lack of dominant 
paradigm in an academic discipline), people are more likely to use particularistic criteria 
such as social influence rather than universal ones in allocating awards (i.e., grants). So 
this study also expects that, under high levels of uncertainty, corporate headquarters are 
more likely to allocate resources to a higher status division, which would make the rela-
tionship between the status of a division and the division’s product location choice more 
pronounced. 
Uncertainty could involve many different forms depending on the context in 
question: the quality of investment banking service (Podolny, 1993), the quality of the 
product (Podolny, 1994), quality of the technology (Podolny and Stuart, 1995), or the 
lack of a dominant paradigm (Pfeffer, et al., 1976). With respect to allocation of re-
sources on the part of corporate headquarters, the uncertainty about the outcome of any 
resource allocation will be high when the competition in the market is high, thus the re-
sults of investment at the hands of corporate headquarters are highly uncertain. This idea 
leads to the second hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 2. The higher the level of competitive uncertainty, the pre-
dicted relationship between the status of a division and that division’s 
product location choice [i.e., the higher the status of a division, the 
greater the distance between that division’s new product and its own ex-
isting products.] will be stronger. 
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Inter-firm Divisional Domain Overlap and New Product Location Choice 
 
In the above I have argued that a higher status division is more likely to launch 
its new product farther way from its existing product lines than lower status division; 
and this relationship will be more pronounced when the level of uncertainty felt by a 
firm is high. Then, how about new product location vis-à-vis rival products? Here comes 
the role of a division’s inter-firm divisional overlap with rival divisions. As shown in 
Figure 3.1, each division has its own divisional domain and is faced with rival divisions 
of competing firms. Here rival divisions of a focal division refer to divisions whose divi-
sional domains overlap with the focal division’s domain. I argue that the degree of a di-
vision’s inter-firm divisional overlap with a rival division would affect the way the focal 
division chooses the location of its new product vis-à-vis that rival division.  
The literature on competition from organizational ecology, economics, and stra-
tegic management suggests that the degree domain overlap between a focal firm and 
competing firms is positively related to the intensity of competition the focal firm ex-
periences (Hannan and Freeman, 1977, 1989; Scherer and Ross, 1990; Tirole, 1988; Por-
ter, 1980; Baum and Korn, 1996). This is because firms targeting similar markets have 
similar resource requirements, which increases the potential for competition among them 
seeking the same resources. Here resources can refer to customers, organizational mem-
bers, or clients (e.g., Hannan and Freeman, 1989). In other words, as the breadth of mar-
kets between two firms increases, the potential for competition increases.  
The increase of the breadth of markets, however, does not necessarily lead to an 
increase in the intensity of competition (Baum and Korn, 1996). Even though the breadth 
of overlapped market increases, the intensity of competition may not increase propor-
tionately because the competition may be diffused over a greater scope of markets and 
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the need for mutual forbearance may also increase (cf. Edwards, 1955; Gimeno and 
Woo, 1996; Baum and Korn, 1996). But in a differentiated industry that the current 
study is concerned with, mutual forbearance may not hold. Mutual forbearance works 
well when market boundaries are well defined (Singal, 1996) and, in the case of a differ-
entiated market, firms should successfully cartelize at least one of the product markets in 
isolation so that firms can cross-subsidy other markets using slacking from this success-
fully isolated market (Bernheim and Whinston, 1990). Thus, if an industry with differen-
tiated products is characterized with products that are closely related to one another 
through a series of chains of demands, i.e., high cross-elasticity among adjacent products 
and low potential for isolating one particular product market, mutual forbearance may 
not work well. 
Prior empirical studies from this perspective have validated this logic. Studies 
found that hotels that are similar with respect to size, geographic location, and price are 
more likely to compete against one another (Baum and Mezias, 1992); day care centers 
that are similar in terms of the ages of target children and geographic location compete 
more intensely with one another (Baum and Singh, 1994a, 1994b); the competition be-
tween two voluntary organizations is proportional to the similarity of their memberships 
in terms of sociodemographic characteristics (i.e., the degree of niche overlap) (McPher-
son, 1983); and the degree of niche overlap has a negative impact on organizations’ life 
chances due to increased competition among firms in the niche (Podolny, Stuart, and 
Hannan, 1996). 
The argument of divisional charter or domain (Galunic and Eisenhardt, 1996, 
2000) or organizational domain (Thompson, 1967) also suggests that the resource re-
quirements of a focal division are quite similar with those of rival divisions (of compet-
ing firms) that cover similar domains or charters. So the level of competition between 
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two rival divisions would be proportional to the degree of divisional overlap between the 
two. However, a given level of divisional overlap would pose a different threat or com-
petitive pressure to the divisions concerned due to the asymmetric nature of domain 
overlap. 
Competitive asymmetry occurs because the same absolute amount of overlap can 
be interpreted differently depending on a firm’s overall domain (Chen, 1996; Podolny, et 
al., 1996; McPherson, 1983). For example, let’s assume a focal firm occupies an area of 
50 and its rival firm 100, and the domain overlap between the two firms is 20. For the 
focal firm the overlapped portion with its rival firm is 40% of its domain, whereas for 
the rival firm it is 20%. Thus the focal firm should feel more competitive pressure than 
the rival firm. And it is not surprising that the focal firm would regard the rival firm 
more seriously than the rival firm does. In this regard Chen (1996: 117-118) suggests 
that: 
 
Firms that are considered nonkey competitors may be granted a wide lati-
tude of action without provoking retaliation from their stronger counter-
parts. Similarly, stronger rivals may not be aware of the threat from 
weaker opponents, which view such powerful firms as their main targets. 
Such weaker firms may go unrealized or disregarded despite the damage 
they may inflict. 
 
So what matters is not as much as overlap itself between rivals as the meaning or 
significance of the overlap to the rivals concerned. I believe that this logic would also 
hold for divisions and divisional overlap between rival divisions. A focal division with 
high level of domain overlap with a rival division proportional to its own domain would 
feel a more competitive threat than the rival division does, which may encourage the fo-
cal division to be more aggressive toward the rival division. This suggests that a division 
with a higher level of domain overlap (proportional to its own domain) would be more 
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aggressive or competitive in locating their new products than the one with a low level 
domain overlap with a rival division. In sum, a division with a high degree of inter-firm 
divisional domain overlap has more incentives to launch a competitive attack against the 
rival division.  
Then, where does the focal division launch its new product? This study argues 
that we can find a clue in the argument of mimicry: firms are more likely to imitate or 
take seriously direct competing firms in their strategic actions. Firms observe one an-
other’s actions, then determine who are their major rivals, and then based on this obser-
vation define unique product positions in relation to one another (Porac, Thomas, Wil-
son, Paton, and Kanfer, 1995). From the perspective of multimarket contact among 
competing firms, Greve (1995, 1996) also found that radio stations would be more likely 
to adopt the format of their multimarket competitors. These studies suggest that mimetic 
strategic actions between firms may increase as their market overlap increases. This pro-
vides a clue how a focal division position its new product in relation to its divisional 
domain overlap with rival divisions of competing firms: the focal division may imitate 
the product positions of its rival division with whom it has high level of divisional over-
lap. 
And the notion of product cannibalization, in this case intra-divisional cannibali-
zation, suggests that a focal division has incentives to avoid inadvertently cannibalizing 
its own products (cf. Copulsky, 1976). Thus a focal division is more likely to locate its 
new product in such a location where the chances of intra-divisional cannibalization 
could be minimized. The location may be outside the range of the focal division’s divi-
sional domain. In this way the focal division may pursue competitive parity with rival 
divisions, which might decrease the level of competition (cf. Baum and Korn, 1996) 
Thus, the following hypothesis is tested. 
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Hypothesis 3. The higher the degree of a focal division’s inter-firm divi-
sional overlap with a rival division, proportional to the focal division’s 
divisional domain, the closer the distance between the focal division’s 
new product and the rival division’s existing products.   
 
A division’s decision to locate its new product closer to rival divisions’ products 
suggests that over time a division with a higher degree of divisional overlap with rival 
divisions of competing firm may expand its divisional domain. Through a series of mi-
metic processes in product location choice, the divisional structure or charters of 
competing firms would look more or less alike. And this may further lead to a long-term 
consistency between the organizational structures of competing firms.  
In addition to the degree of a focal division’s inter-firm divisional overlap, the 
density of a division would play an important role in explaining the division’s new prod-
uct location choice. Here the density of a division refers to how crowded the division’s 
domain is. Thus, higher density means that the products offered by a division are closely 
located to one another, which increases chances of intra-division cannibalization. So the 
tendency to avoid intra-divisional cannibalization will affect a division’s new product 
location choice vis-à-vis rival products. 
The literature on horizontal product differentiation suggests that unlike the case 
of homogeneous goods, an industry with differentiated goods is characterized with local-
ized competition (Schmalensee, 1978, 1985; Eaton and Lipsey, 1979, 1989; Judd, 1985). 
The basic idea of localized competition is that a product does not compete directly with 
all the products in the market, but with a small number of products that are close to the 
product. In a one-dimensional product characteristic space, a product has at most two di-
rectly competing products that surround it (Schmalensee, 1978). And the products that 
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are located next to these two directly competing products become indirectly competing 
products (Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1986b). For example, when there are products A, B, 
C, D, and E from left to right in a one-dimensional product characteristic space, the di-
rectly competing products of product B are products A and C, whereas product D is an 
indirectly competing products. Consequently the intensity of competition for product B 
mainly revolves around products A and C. The competition between products B and D is 
mediated by product C. In other words the cross-elasticity between product B and prod-
ucts A and C is higher than that between product B and product D. Therefore a new 
product does not compete directly with all the products in the market, but with only 
those who are located close to it on the product space. Eaton and Lipsey (1989: 750) 
provide a succinct summary about this localized competition in an industry with differ-
entiated products. 
 
But in address models, the location of existing goods or products balkan-
izes the market into a number of overlapping submarkets. As a result, 
competition is localized – each good has only a few neighboring goods 
with which it competes directly, regardless of the number of goods serv-
ing the entire market. 
 
One of the immediate consequences of high level of density, or close located 
products by a division is that this may increase the chances of intra-division product 
cannibalization. This further implies that when the density of a focal division is higher 
than that of rival divisions, the chances of intra-divisional product cannibalization in-
creases when the focal division attempts to locate its new product distant from the prod-
ucts of rival divisions. The worst case would be when a focal division locates its new 
product between its own existing products in product characteristics space, and the 
chances of this worst scenario may increase as the density of the focal division is higher 
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than that of rival divisions. In this case, new revenue streams from new product intro-
duction would come solely from cannibalized sales, rather than either from market ex-
pansion or from rival divisions’ sales. So when the density of a focal division is high, 
this division has incentives to locate its new product closer to rival products and in so 
doing decrease the chances of intra-divisional product cannibalization. 
This expectation would also hold for vertical differentiation. The primary reason 
of a firm to locate its products far away from rival products is to relax price competition 
that might occur due to close location to rival products (e.g., Shaked and Sutton, 1982). 
This idea also suggests that a division has incentives to locate its new products distant 
from its current products to relax any potential intra-division product cannibalization. So 
when the density of a focal division is high, we expect that the loss due to locating its 
new product closer to its existing products (i.e., loss due to intra-divisional cannibaliza-
tion) may exceed the loss due to locating its new product closer to the products of rival 
divisions (i.e., loss due to intensified competition). This idea leads to the following hy-
pothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 4. The higher the density of a focal division’s divisional do-
main is, the predicted relationship between the degree of the focal divi-
sion’s inter-firm divisional domain overlap and product location choice 
(i.e., the higher the degree of a focal division’s inter-firm divisional over-
lap with a rival division, proportional to the focal division’s domain, the 
closer the distance between the focal division’s new product and the rival 
division’s existing products) will be stronger. 
 
Intra-firm Divisional Domain Overlap and New Product Location Choice 
 
Intra-firm divisional domain overlap indicates that there exists internal competi-
tion among divisions of the same firm vying for the same customers. Internal competi-
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tion could help the firm, or at least be tolerated, depending on the intensity of competi-
tion and the context of competition. R&D competition between distinct development 
teams may reduce the development time (Kim, 1997; Gold, 1987); to survive disruptive 
innovations, firms should set up an small and autonomous organization equipped with 
disruptive innovations and let the organization compete against a parent company that 
pursues innovations based on sustaining technology (Christensen, 1997); or a reasonable 
level of internal competition is good for the firm (Mintzberg, 1991). Another study 
shows that internal competition among subgroups in a package delivery company im-
proved quality control, a feature that is critical to company success (Kortick and 
O’Brien, 1996), whereas there is a report that internal competition creates quality prob-
lems (Posner, 1989). 
Some firms (e.g., General Motors, Proctor & Gamble, and Hewlett-Packard) 
have traditionally allowed internal competition between subunits including divisions. 
For example, Hewlett-Packard has allowed its laser-jet printer division and ink-jet 
printer division compete against each other for printer markets. Intense competition 
among divisions, however, has become a problem, even for a company such as GM that 
has traditionally tolerated internal competition. Mr. Hoglund, GM’s Executive Vice 
President points out (Cordtz, 1993: 22-25):  
 
A few years ago GM had four different management systems, four dif-
ferent billing systems, three or four different materials scheduling sys-
tems for components – for no good reason. Chevy was trying to screw 
Pontiac, Olds was trying to screw Buick and Fisher Body was screw-
ing all of us. Under the old system, with all our problems we’d all just 
be working harder to kill one another. Now we are trying to convince 
people in the divisions that they don’t have to fight each other, that 
they can concentrate on fighting other manufacturers. We’re making 
progress, but there’s still a question that our progress is good enough. 
(Italics are mine) 
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As can be seen in the above quote, firms have good reasons to avoid, or at least, 
sever internal competition. First, internal competition among divisions may result in in-
efficient use of resources from the perspective of the firm. Inefficient use of resources 
can be thought of from factor-market and product-market perspectives. From a factor-
market perspective, internal competition makes it hard for the firm to achieve economies 
of scope. Economies of scope can be achieved when subunits of the same firm share re-
sources in their operations, and achieving economies of scope is one of the primary rea-
sons why firms operate in multiple businesses (Teece, 1980). However, when internal 
competition is high, subunits are less likely to share resources or information, thereby 
increasing the firm’s total cost of operation. And from a product-market perspective, in-
ternal competition can lead firms to introduce products with very similar features, which 
may end up cannibalizing one another’s products (e.g., Copulsky, 1976). Thus, internal 
competition can decrease overall firm profits partly due to redundancy. For example, 
part of the reason the revenue from IBM’s server group dropped from $2.9 billion in the 
3rd quarter of 1998 to $2 billion in the same period of 1999 is due to internal competition 
and consequent redundancies between the AS/400 line and the Unix products (Korze-
nowski, 1999). 
Second, internal competition may foster subunit identification at the expense of 
organizational identification, which may hurt firm performance in the long run. Organ-
izational identification is a “cognitive link between the definitions of the organization 
and the self,” and can be regarded as “one form of psychological attachment that occurs 
when members adopt the defining characteristics of the organization as defining charac-
teristics for themselves” (Dutton, Dukerich, and Harquail, 1994: 242). When a division 
competes against other divisions in the same firm, this division would be more con-
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cerned with obtaining its own division goals, which may encourage the members of the 
division to identify themselves with their own division. As members identify themselves 
with their own division, they are more likely to evaluate the alternatives of choice in 
terms of their consequences for their own division (Simon, 1997) and focus their atten-
tion “on particular values, particular items of empirical knowledge, and particular behav-
ior alternatives for consideration, to the exclusion of other values, other knowledge, and 
other possibilities.” (Simon, 1997: 288).9 This may create blind spots for divisions and 
end up creating excessive capacity in a firm (cf. Zajac and Bazerman, 1991). Excessive 
divisional identification further reinforces already intensified internal competition 
among divisions (cf. Dutton, et al. 1994). 
Third, internal competition could exacerbate agency problems on the part of divi-
sion managers. Internal competition may provide incentives for division managers to 
shirk their optimal behaviors. In compensation incentive design, it is important to link 
efforts and compensation or performance correctly. But internal competition makes it 
hard for corporate headquarters to link division managers’ efforts to their performance 
partly because a division manager’s performance is affected by other division managers’ 
efforts that work against the focal division manager’s performance, in addition to ran-
dom factors such as market uncertainty (cf. Milgrom and Robert, 1992). And internal 
competition among divisions may increase influence costs. Influence costs occur be-
cause of influence activities that arise in organizations when (1) there is a central author-
ity and the decision-making of this central authority affects the distribution of wealth or 
                                                
9 Since organizational identification makes persons to focus on particular values or knowledge at the ex-
clusion of the other alternatives, it may lead persons to wrong or biased decisions. Therefore, Simon 
(1997) further argues that one of the primary tasks of designing organizational structure is to specialize 
and subdivide activities in such a manner that the psychological forces of identification actually help peo-
ple make correct decision-making, or at least minimizes decisional bias arising from the psychological 
forces of identification. 
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other benefits among members or constituent groups of the organization; and (2) in the 
pursuit of their selfish interests, the affected individuals or groups attempt to influence 
the decision to their own benefits (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992).10 Internal competition 
among divisions would intensify the pursuit of divisions’ selfish interests, which would 
increase influence costs. 
The above mentioned concerns would encourage corporate headquarters to check 
internal competition between divisions before it becomes excessive. Internal competition 
basically means high chances of inter-divisional product cannibalization. For a division 
that does cannibalize another division’s products, inter-divisional product cannibaliza-
tion is not a serious problem; it is rather a source of new revenues. But regardless of who 
cannibalizes whom, inter-divisional cannibalization could pose a serious problem for the 
firm as a whole. Thus corporate headquarters would exert pressure on divisions involved 
in inter-divisional cannibalization. Thus divisions’ product location choices would re-
flect this pressure from corporate headquarters. Then how would this internal competi-
tion affect a focal division’s new product location choice vis-à-vis the products of other 
divisions of the same firm? 
                                                
10 For example, a division manager, who wants to secure resources for his division’s project, tries to influ-
ence the decision by corporate headquarters by building the best possible case for its own project (e.g., the 
division has better investment opportunities due to its R&D personnel, production, or marketing capabili-
ties so the resources necessary should be transferred from other divisions to its own), while hiding the po-
tential difficulties of the project and at the same time trying to undercut the competing projects from other 
divisions of the same firm. In this case, influence costs come from several sources: (1) a central decision-
maker and its supporting staff should spend time and resources to get the information about the project in 
question including competing ones; (2) the division manager expends resources to influence the decision-
maker in its favor (if the division manager fails in influencing the decision in its favor, then the influence 
activities represent a cost without any offsetting gain; if the division manager succeeds in making the cen-
tral decision-maker intervene inappropriately, then further costs occur due to bad decisions and their im-
plementation); (3) if the central decision-maker recognizes the possibilities of influence activities and 
takes appropriate actions to control influence activities, these actions will bring additional costs to the or-
ganization. 
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This study argues that we can also get some implications by examining the nature 
of internal competition between a focal division and other division(s) in the firm. And 
the nature of internal competition would be better captured by the degree of a focal divi-
sion’s intra-firm divisional overlap with another or other divisions of the same firm. The 
literature on niche overlap and competitive dynamics suggests that a focal organization 
with a higher degree of overlap would feel more competitive pressure than one with a 
lower degree of overlap with the focal organization (e.g., Hannan and Freeman, 1989; 
McPherson, 1983; Baum and Korn, 1996; Chen, 1996). Thus we can expect that, as in 
inter-firm divisional domain overlap, a focal division with a higher degree of intra-firm 
divisional domain overlap with another division of the same firm would feel more com-
petitive pressure and is more likely to act to take care of this pressure.  
But, unlike in inter-firm divisional domain overlap, this competitive pressure 
from a high degree of intra-firm divisional overlap would not make a focal division to 
locate its product closer to the products of another division with which the focal division 
has domain overlap. The focal division would rather locate its new product farther away 
from another division’s divisional domain as a way to lessen the competitive pressure 
from intra-firm divisional domain overlap. For a focal division, a high degree of intra-
firm divisional overlap means that the chances of being cannibalized by another division 
are very high, which would motivate the focal division to act to reduce the chances of 
being cannibalized, i.e., move farther away from the other division’s domain. And for a 
focal division, a high degree of intra-firm divisional overlap means that it would be ex-
tremely hard to determine the division’s unique contribution to the overall firm perform-
ance, which may jeopardize the division’s raison d’être. Thus a focal division with high 
degree of intra-firm divisional overlap has more incentives to locate its new product far-
ther away from the products of other division with which it has divisional overlap. 
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Hypothesis 5. The higher the degree of a focal division’s intra-firm divi-
sional overlap with a sister division of the same firm, proportional to the 
focal division’s domain, the greater the distance between the focal divi-
sion’s new product and the sister division’s existing products.  
 
This study also expects that the impact of a focal division’s intra-firm divisional 
overlap on its new product location choice would be different depending upon its status 
in the firm. We could regard intra-firm divisional overlap between divisions as a mani-
festation of conflicts over their respective goals in the product markets, which needs to 
be resolved. Any kind of conflicts resolution in an organization involves politics at every 
level (Cyert and March, 1992), and subunits have different interests over the same in-
formation, the bargaining power of concerned parties being critical in the resolution (Ar-
row, 1974). Thus we can argue that a higher status division would likely have an upper 
hand in resolving conflicts over divisional domains with other lower status divisions of 
the same firm. 
Related to the higher bargaining power or politics in solving conflicts between 
divisions, the literature on status provides some evidence. Weber (1968) and Coleman 
(1990) contend that individuals or groups with high social status receive favorable 
treatment by other parties in the same community who want to engage with them in so-
cial or economic interactions. Weber (1968) also argues that higher status holders have 
privileges that work for their own benefits, which is respected or recognized by lower 
status holders. Leffler, et al. (1982) also found that higher status holders are more likely 
to intrude upon other parties’ space or interrupt other parties in their interactions than 
lower status holders. Thus we expect that in the presence of intra-firm divisional overlap, 
a higher status division would be less likely to move farther away from the products of a 
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lower status division with which it has overlapped domain. Specifically this study tests 
the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 6. The higher the status of a focal division, the predicted rela-
tionship of intra-firm divisional overlap and intra-firm divisional new 
product distance (i.e., the higher the degree of a focal division’s intra-
firm divisional overlap with a sister division, the greater the distance be-
tween the focal division’s new product and the sister division’s existing 
products) will be weaker. 
 
One of the primary tasks of corporate headquarters is coordinating divisional ac-
tivities using control apparatuses such as incentives or disciplinary actions (Chandler, 
1995[1962]; Williamson, 1975, 1985). Corporate headquarters can facilitate divisional 
cooperation by providing incentives that emphasize corporate-wide performance or fos-
ter internal competition through incentives that highly regard independent divisional per-
formance (Hill, et al., 1992; Hambrick, 1994). This suggests that depending on the na-
ture of incentives that are provided to corporate executives, divisions may be more tuned 
to cooperate with each other or pursue their own interests at the expense of other divi-
sions.   
When the incentives are to reward higher corporate performance, corporate ex-
ecutives or divisional managers would try to work toward increasing corporate perform-
ance. This implies that higher levels of inter-divisional product cannibalization would be 
less likely to contribute to increasing corporate-wide performance. Thus corporate ex-
ecutives may exercise their influence in reducing inter-divisional product cannibalization 
that is reflected in higher levels of intra-firm divisional overlap. And divisional manag-
ers whose divisions have higher levels of divisional domain overlap with other divisions 
would be under more pressure by corporate headquarters or have more incentives to re-
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duce the level of divisional domain overlap with other divisions of the same firm. This 
idea leads to the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 7. The stronger the emphasis of corporate incentive systems 
on firm-wide performance, the predicted relationship of intra-firm divi-
sional overlap and intra-firm divisional new product distance (i.e., the 
higher the degree of a focal division’s intra-firm divisional overlap with a 
sister division, the greater the distance between the focal division’s new 
product and the sister division’s existing products) will be stronger. 
 
Up to now I have argued that firms have incentives not to intensify internal com-
petition among divisions, which is reflected in the degree of divisional domain overlap 
inside the firm. But intra-firm divisional overlap usually happens and the degree of divi-
sional domain overlap affects a division’s product location choice. Related to intra-firm 
divisional domain overlap and consequent product location choice behavior of a divi-
sion, this study further argues that the status of a division would affect the degree of di-
visional overlap that the focal division would have with other divisions of the same firm 
in the first place. The literature on product cannibalization provides some clues how the 
status of a division would affect the degree of intra-divisional overlap in the first place. 
The literature on product cannibalization suggests that even though firms have 
incentives to avoid inadvertent intra-firm product cannibalization (Copulsky, 1976), 
there are certain situations that the firm may allow product cannibalization. First, when a 
new business opportunity emerges, multiple divisions in the same firm may attempt to 
exploit the opportunity and the firm may allow cannibalization in order to preempt that 
rising market segment, a scenario which may end up in intra-firm product cannibaliza-
tion (Schwartz and Thompson, 1986; Baye, et al., 1996a, 1996b; Galunic and Eisen-
hardt, 1996, 2000). A case in point is the development and sales of small or compact car 
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by the Big Three in the U.S. automobile industry (Chandler, 1995[1962]). Second, if the 
total net profits or cash flows increase due to a new product introduction, internal com-
petition between divisions and consequent intra-firm cannibalization could be tolerated 
(Traylor, 1986; Reddy, et al., 1994; Kerin, et al., 1978). For example, in their study on 
75 brand line extensions by 34 regular filter brands in the cigarette industry during 1950-
1984, Reddy, et al. (1994) found that intra-firm cannibalization didn’t pose much nega-
tive impact on firm profits and line extensions into earlier subcategories actually may 
have helped the parent brand. Third, intra-firm cannibalization can be tolerated if com-
petitive or sales objectives supersede profit objectives (Traylor, 1986; Nault and Van-
denbosch, 1996; Chandy and Tellis, 1998; Kerin et al., 1978). Firms seeking long-term 
strategic benefit from an increase in its market share and market power may accept 
short-term losses resulting from cannibalization in so far as it stands to increase market 
power overall. Many firms have launched Internet businesses at the expense of losing 
sales in their established businesses, in part, to preempt Internet businesses before their 
rivals do.11  Christensen (1997) demonstrates that cannibalization is necessary for the 
success of ‘disruptive innovation’ based on disruptive technology: a small independent 
organization that pursues a disruptive innovation should be allowed to compete against 
its parent or other divisions pursuing sustaining innovations. In sum, the literature on 
product cannibalization suggests that unless a new product introduction by a focal divi-
sion achieves a competitive preemption, superior performance, or other strategic objec-
tives, the firm may not allow intra-firm cannibalization that is reflected in intra-firm di-
visional domain overlap.  
                                                
11 Charles Schwab’s schwab.com proved to be successful not only because it contributed to the increased 
sales of the firm at large after the short-term loss of its launch, but more importantly because it grabbed 
42% of a new market that would otherwise have been dominated by upstarters like E*Trade (Useem, 
1999). 
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With respect to the status of a firm and its impact on the initial intra-divisional 
overlap, the conditions of achieving superior performance and strategic objectives by a 
new product introduction deserve special attention. Achieving superior performance by 
introducing a new product suggests that a new product introduction into another divi-
sion’s divisional domain by a focal division and consequent intra-firm or inter-divisional 
product cannibalization may be allowed if the firm can produce net profits or cash flow 
due to the new product introduction, i.e., the newly introduced product should perform 
far better than cannibalized products of another division. The economic status of a divi-
sion is determined by the economic performance of the division, and this economic 
status in turn affects the political status and prestigious status of the division inside the 
firm, or vice versa (cf., Benoit-Smullyan, 1944). Thus, a division with higher economic 
status has its current level of status primarily because its products have performed better 
than the products of other firms. This implies that it would be harder for a division to 
launch its new product into the divisional domain of a higher status division and expect 
its new product to perform far better than the cannibalized products of the higher status 
division. So the focal division may abstain from introducing a new product into the divi-
sional domain of a higher status division. In addition to this, the political clout of a 
higher status division may deter the attempt of other divisions to launch a new product 
into its own divisional domain. 
Another condition wherein the firm may allow inter-divisional product cannibali-
zation is when the cannibalization has some strategic objectives that supersede at least 
short-term profit objectives. However, when a subunit pursues strategic objectives af-
fecting a powerful subunit in a firm (i.e., the strategic objectives have potential for inter-
divisional cannibalization), the subunit is usually faced with resistance and may not ob-
tain sufficient resources that are necessary for implementing the strategic objectives. So 
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when a firm wants to successfully launch a disruptive technology that may cannibalize 
the firm’s major product lines by a dominant division, the firm may better set up an 
autonomous organization (Christensen, 1997). And when a firm wants to launch a dras-
tic innovation for market leadership, the firm should have a certain organizational cul-
ture such as “willingness to cannibalization” that fosters internal competition among 
strategic business units (Chandy and Tellis, 1998). So if the focal division wants to pur-
sue a strategic objective that may cannibalize the products of a dominant division, corpo-
rate executives should provide support for the focal division or foster an atmosphere of 
willingness to cannibalization inside the firm. However, the dominant division may re-
sist this by exercising its political clout based on political or prestige status in resource 
allocation to the strategic objective. This idea suggests that the chances that a lower 
status division launches a new product into the domain of a higher status division would 
be low in the first place, if not impossible. Thus, the following hypothesis is tested. 
 
Hypothesis 8. The lower the status of a focal division, proportional to 
that of a sister division, the greater the distance will be between the focal 
division’s new product and the sister division’s existing products. 
 
The hypotheses presented up to now intend to capture the impact of divisionali-
zation and product cannibalization on product location choice. The hypotheses have 
suggested that with respect to divisionalization and product cannibalization, three factors 
may affect a division’s product location choice: intra-firm status relative to other divi-
sions, inter-firm divisional domain overlap, and intra-firm divisional domain overlap. 
This study expects that a division would be less likely to introduce a new product that 
may cannibalize its own products (i.e., intra-division product cannibalization). And it 
would also try a new product introduction that may avoid or at least reduce inter-
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divisional cannibalization. However, a higher status division would be less restricted by 
the concern for intra-firm cannibalization than lower-status divisions and more likely try 
to introduce a new product that is distant from their current products, if necessary. On 
the contrary, lower-status divisions would be less likely to introduce a new product that 
may take sales from higher-status divisions. This internal consideration is augmented by 
an external consideration: inter-firm divisional overlap. A division with higher degree of 
inter-firm divisional overlap will be more likely to be aggressive and more likely to in-
trude rival divisions’ territory, but this intrusion may be restricted if it triggers intra-firm 
cannibalization. 
In summation, the hypotheses suggest that divisionalization shapes a division’s 
behaviors toward other divisions (i.e., sister divisions) of the same firm, and toward its 
rival divisions, which consequently triggers competitive pressure from them. And these 
two behaviors affect the way the division locates its new products in the market. Thus, 
the hypotheses provide a clue to how the way a firm divisionalizes itself may affect the 
firm’s competitive behaviors in the product market in the context of choosing the loca-
tion of its new product.  
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CHAPTER IV 
RESEARCH METHODS 
 
Sample Description 
 
U.S. automobile industry 
 
This study collected data from the U.S. automobile industry.12 Here the U.S. 
automobile industry includes not only U.S. automobile manufacturers but also foreign 
automobile manufacturers that sell their products in the U.S. The U.S. automobile indus-
try can be characterized as a marriage of two concepts: one by GM that emphasizes the 
production of a large number of different types of cars; and the other by Ford that 
stresses the large-scale production of a standard line of cars (Friedlaender, Winston, and 
Wang, 1983). Consequently the U.S. automobile industry is characterized by large-scale 
production of differentiated products. Each company produces and sells multiple prod-
ucts that have different characteristics from one another. No two products, by definition, 
can be identical, but should be different from one another to some extent. Some products 
may be quite different from one another (e.g., Lincoln Town Car vs. Ford Escort), 
whereas some others may share quite similar characteristics (e.g., Ford Taurus vs. Mer-
cury Sable).13 This fact that the U.S. automobile industry produces multiple products 
with differentiated characteristics makes it a good empirical setting to test hypotheses on 
product differentiation. 
                                                
12 For an excellent treatment of the U.S. and the world automobile industries, readers are referred to Aber-
nathy (1978), Clark and Fujimoto (1991), Clark, Chew, and Fujimoto (1987), and Clark (1983). 
13 As of 1997, Lincon Town Car belongs to Luxury market class, whereas Ford Escort belongs to small car 
market class. And Ford Taurus shares the same platform with Mercury Sable. 
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In addition to the fact that the U.S. automobile industry is characterized with 
multiple products with differentiated characteristics, many firms have multiple operating 
divisions that produce and/or sell vehicles to the U.S. customers. In 1997, GM produced 
vehicles in 6 different divisions: Buick, Cadillac, Chevrolet, Oldsmobile, Pontiac, and 
Saturn. And Chrysler had two divisions: Chrysler-Plymouth-Jeep-Eagle Division and 
Dodge Division. Ford has traditionally two operating divisions: Ford Division and Lin-
coln-Mercury Division. And several foreign firms use more than one division to sell 
their cars in the U.S.14 Starting in the late 1980s, Toyota has run Toyota Division and 
Lexus Division; Nissan has operated Nissan Division and Infiniti Division; and Honda 
has run Honda and Acura Divisions. And until the mid-1980s, Volkswagen had used 
Audi and Porsche Divisions in selling their cars in the U.S. The fact that major players in 
the industry have multiple operating divisions makes the industry a good empirical set-
ting to test the predictions on the effects of divisionalization.  
In summation, the existence of multiple differentiated products and distinct mul-
tiple divisions makes the U.S. automobile industry an ideal setting to test the hypotheses. 
Regarding sample characteristics, a couple of things should be noted. First, since the hy-
potheses explicitly test the role of divisions, the sample only includes those firms with 
multiple divisions. Second, the study focuses on passenger cars in the traditional sense. 
So SUVs, vans, and light-duty trucks (e.g., pickup trucks) were excluded from the sam-
ple. Thus, whenever the study mentions vehicles, cars, or automobiles, they all refer to 
passenger cars. 
 
                                                
14 This information is based on Market Data Book 1998, published by Automotive News. 
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Data  
 
The study uses data on product characteristics for all car models sold in the 
United States between 1979 and 1999. The main data source for the product characteris-
tics of the models is Ward’s Automotive Year Book (AYB) which is supplemented by 
Automotive News Market Data Book (MDB). Both publications are well-known and reli-
able yearly publications that have been used by many prior studies on the U.S. automo-
bile industry (e.g., Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes, 1995; Thomas and Weigelt, 2000). The 
data that came from these publications include car sales, model product specifications, 
car prices, and market class of each car, among others. Here market class is a segment of 
the market in which a car competes; this market class or segment is determined by vehi-
cle size, price, and marketing intent. 
Product characteristics of car models include weight, wheelbase, horsepower, 
length, height, width, engine displacement, and EPA (Environmental Protection Agency) 
miles per gallon rating. In addition to these characteristics, the data include information 
about automobile capacity such as fuel tank (U.S. gallons) or cooling system. It also in-
cludes some information about optional equipments such as automatic transmission, 
power steering, and air conditioning. Among these characteristics, I use wheelbase, 
horsepower, length, width, and MPG (miles per gallon) in calculating product distances 
of any two car models (cf. Berry, et al., 1995; Thomas and Weigelt, 2000). 
Prices of each car model are base prices (i.e., list retail price of the base model) 
that include the manufacturer’s suggested retail price and the destination charge, but do 
not include state and local taxes, or optional equipment. Actual transaction prices are 
preferred to the list price of the base model, but as Berry, et al. (1995) and Thomas and 
Weigelt (2000) have mentioned, the data on transaction prices of individual cars are hard 
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to obtain. And following prior studies, base model is defined as the least expensive ver-
sion of the model – base model usually implies a two-door sedan or a car with a 
hatchback. Nominal prices were adjusted using the Consumer Price Index − all prices 
are 1983 constant dollars. Consequently, the product characteristics mentioned in the 
previous paragraph corresponds to the product characteristics of a base model.  
The data also include information on sales. They have information on the number 
of units sold of each car model: the division that sold each car model. The data also 
specifies whether a certain car model was imported.  
The data provide information on market class. For example, Market Data Book 
1998 classifies cars sold in 1997 into nine market classes 15 based on vehicle size, price, 
and marketing intent: budget, small, lower mid-range, mid-range, upper mid-range, spe-
cialty, sporty, luxury, near luxury.16 Casual perusal of each market class shows that sev-
eral divisions of the same firm compete in the same market class with different products. 
For example, in upper mid-range class, Ford Crown Victoria (Ford Div., Ford) competes 
with Mercury Grand Marquis (Lincoln-Mercury Div., Ford), Dodge Intrepid (Dodge 
Div., Chrysler) Chrysler Concorde (Chrysler-Plymouth-Jeep-Eagle Div., Chrysler), 
                                                
15 In addition to nine classes for cars, Market Data Book 1998 also classifies van and light truck classes as 
follows: Minivan, Full-sized van, full-sized pickup, full-sized sport-utility, compact sport-utility, small 
sport-utility, and compact pickup. 
16 Each class includes a variety of cars.  Budget class includes Chevrolet Metro, Nissan Sentra, and Ford 
Aspire among others; Small class includes Honda Civic, Hyundai Scoupe, Ford Escort, Dodge Neon, Sat-
urn, and Pontiac Sunfire, among others; Lower mid-range includes Nissan Altima, Pontiac Grand Am, 
Ford Contour, Oldsmobile Achieva, Buick Skylark, and Chervrolet Corsica-Beretta, among others; Mid-
range class has such cars as Ford Taurus, Chevrolet Lumina, Chevrolet Malibu, Buick Century, Ford 
Thunderbird, and Chrysler Cirrus, among others; Upper mid-range class includes Buick LeSabre, Ford 
Crown Victoria, Pontiac Bonneville, Chrysler Concorde, and Buick Roadmaster, among others; Specialty 
class includes Chevrolette Corvette, Jaguar, Dodge Viper, BMW Z3, and Plymouth Prowler, among oth-
ers; Sporty class has such cars as Ford Mustang, Chrysler Sebring convertible, Chrysler Sebring coupe, 
Ford Probe, and Pontiac Firebird, among others; Luxury class includes Cadillac DeVille, Lincoln Town 
Car, Lincoln Continental, Oldsmobile Aurora, Cadillac Fleetwood, and Lexus LS 400, among others, and 
Near Luxury includes such cars as Buick Park Avenue, Chrysler New Yorker, Buick Riviera, BMW 3 se-
ries, and Oldsmobile Ninety Eight, among others. 
   
  
80
Pontiac Bonneville (Pontiac Div., GM), and Buick Roadmaster (Buick Div., GM). We 
can see that a division competes not only with the models of rival divisions, but also 
with those of other divisions of the same firm (i.e., sister divisions) in the same market 
segment. 
In addition to the information on car models and their characteristics, the data 
also include information on executive compensation. The information on executive 
compensation is from Proxy Statements filed with the Securities and Exchanges Com-
mission. Annual Proxy Statements report compensation information on the five highest-
paid executives of the publicly traded firm. The study uses compensation information on 
stock option and cash to capture a firm’s incentives for cooperation among divisions for 
increasing overall firm performance.  
The original data set covers years between 1979 and 1999 and consists of 3,379 
observations. Each observation corresponds to each car model offered by a division into 
the U.S. automobile markets (passenger car markets to be exact). And each observation 
includes information about the firm and the division of a car model in question, its speci-
fications and base prices, and identifies whether this car model is newly introduced in a 
given year. Following Berry, et al. (1995) and Thomas and Weigelt (2000), it is assumed 
that a car model is a new one if it meets one of the two conditions: (1) it bears a new 
name that didn’t appear in previous years; or (2) its horsepower, width, length, and 
wheelbase has changed more than 10 percent in comparison with a model bearing the 
same name in the previous year.  
Out of these 3,379 observations, I excluded those observations of car models that 
have been offered by single-division firms, which reduced the number of observations to 
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2,323.17 And out of these 2,323 observations, I only used observations with new car 
models. Thus, this study ended up with 163 observations which constitute the base data. 
The unit of observation for the base data is model-year. We could index an ob-
servation of this data set as imt, where i refers to a focal division; m is a new car model 
of this division; and t refers to year. This base data set is constructed to test hypotheses 
about the distance of a new product of a focal division and this focal division’s existing 
products, i.e., intra-divisional new product distance (Hypotheses 1& 2).  
To test the remaining hypotheses that require dyadic relations between divisions, 
two additional data sets were created from the base data set. First, I created a data set to 
test hypotheses about new product distances vis-à-vis rival products (Hypotheses 3 & 4). 
The unit of analysis for this data set is inter-firm division dyad-model-year. We could 
index an observation of this data set as irmt, where ir is a division dyad between focal 
division i and rival division r; m is a new car model of focal division i; and t refers to 
year. This data set has 1,780 observations. Divisions i and r should come from a firm 
that has multiple divisions. 
Second, another data set was created to test hypotheses about product distances 
vis-à-vis the products of sister divisions (i.e., other divisions of the same firm) (Hy-
potheses 5 through 8). The unit of analysis is intra-firm division dyad-model-year. We 
could index an observation of this data set as ijmt, where ij is a division dyad between 
focal division i and sister division j of the same firm (ij); m is a new car model of focal 
division i; and t refers to year. This data set has 297 observations. 
 
                                                
17 These 3,379 observations were used in calculating the scalar quality index of a car model. Table 1 has 
information about the descriptive statistics and correlations coefficients on price and product characteris-
tics used in the calculation. And Table 2 shows the results of instrumental variable estimation based on the 
original 3379 observations. 
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Operationalization of Variables 
 
Dependent variable 
 
Product distances ( imNEWDIST , irmNEWDIST , ijmNEWDIST ) Dependent 
variables of the study are the distances between a new car model in question and (1) the 
same division (intra-divisional distance), (2) a rival division (inter-firm divisional dis-
tance), and (3) another division that belongs to the same firm (intra-firm divisional dis-
tance). These measures were calculated through the following procedures. 
First, I calculated the scalar utility index of each car model. To measure the util-
ity, I estimated the following equation which is due to Berry, et al. (1995).18   
 
(4.1)                                   δγαP                     mtmtmt ε+⋅+⋅+′+= mtmt tsxβln   
mtPln  is the log-transformed real price of car model m at year t; mtx  is the vector 
of product attributes of car model m at year t; mts  is the market share of car model m in 
terms of units sold at year t (i.e., units-sold of car model m divided by total number of 
units sold in the market); and mtt  is a trend variable (calculated by subtracting 1977 from 
t). (Some issues in estimating the equation (4.1) will be discussed in the next section on 
statistical techniques.) 
The observable utility of a car model is captured by mm xU β′= , where the vector 
includes wheel base, length, width, horse power, and miles per gallon efficiency of the 
model. This measure of utility of each model mU  reflects a different magnitude of im-
                                                
18 This form was used by Thomas and Weigelt (2000) in their calculation of the quality measure of a car 
model. The function is composed of two additive terms: product characteristics and consumer characteris-
tics. 
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pact of each product attribute (i.e., dimension), which is represented by β′ in the equa-
tion. In other words, the measure captures the willingness of consumers to pay more on 
certain product attributes than other attributes.19 In essence, the measure is a reduction of 
n-dimensional product attributes into a scalar with the consideration of demand and 
equilibrium price: utility. Thus, mU  represents a location on one-dimensional product 
space defined by utility; we can represent the product location of each car model as a 
point on this one-dimensional space. 
Since each model has its own utility index (or a point on the one-dimensional 
product space defined by utility), it is straightforward to calculate the distance between 
any two models. The distance between car models m and n in a given year is the differ-
ence of their respective utility.20 
(4.2)                                                         UUD                           
 
nmmn −=
  
We need to calculate the distance between a car model in question and a division. 
Note that this division could be the one to which this car model belongs (i), or another 
division of the same firm (j), or a rival division of a competing firm (r). A division usu-
ally manages multiple car models, so we should decide specifically how to measure the 
distance. I use the minimum distance of all possible pair-wise distances between a car 
                                                
19 It should be noted that the level of quality due to product attributes would not necessarily coincide with 
the utility level of a product when there exists decreasing marginal utility. Thus, above a certain threshold, 
a firm may substantially increase the quality of its new car model over old ones by enhancing the product 
attributes, but not as much as when it comes to the utility level. 
20 I adopted this way of calculating product distances from Thomas and Weigelt (2000). But instead of us-
ing their notion of ‘quality,’ I use the term ‘utility.’ So here product differentiation is a function of the dif-
ference of utilities between two products, not just of the difference of product attributes. This is to con-
sider the situation that products have decreasing marginal utility. In the case of decreasing marginal utility, 
which is usually the case, moderate differences in product attributes may have very small differences in 
utility. Equation (4.1) basically calculates the impact of product attributes on price with the consideration 
of market demand. This market demand should capture, at least in part, decreasing marginal utility.    
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model in question and the models of a division as the distance between the model and 
the division (cf. Thomas and Weigelt, 2000).  
I calculated intra-divisional distance of a new car model (i.e., distance between a 
new car model in question and its own division) as follows. 
 ( )
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Here imD  refers to the intra-divisional distance of car model m that belongs to 
division i; any car model, regardless of new or old ones, should have this intra-divisional 
distance. imNEWDIST  is the variable of interest, which captures the product distance be-
tween a new model m and other models in the same division. When model m is not a 
new one, this variable would have no value.  
And inter-firm divisional distance of a new car model (i.e., distance between a 
new car model in question and a rival division) was calculated as follows. 
 ( )




=
∈∈=
otherwise        .,
model  new  a  is  m  if   ,D
NEWDIST
r.p , im where,D,,D,DminD
irm
irm
rpim,r2im,r1im,irm L
 
Here irmD represents the inter-firm divisional distance of car model m of division 
i with respect to rival division r. Note that rpim,D  is the pairwise distance between car 
model m of division i and car model p of rival division r. Any car model, regardless of 
new or old ones, should have this inter-firm divisional distance with each rival division. 
irmNEWDIST  is the variable of interest, which captures the product distance between a 
new model m and rival division r. When model m is not a new one, this variable would 
have no value.  
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Lastly, I calculated intra-firm divisional distance of a new car model (i.e., dis-
tance between a new car model and another division of the same firm) as follows. 
 ( )
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Here ijmD represents the intra-firm divisional distance of car model m of division 
i with respect to division j of the same firm f. Note that jpim,D  is the pairwise distance 
between car model m of division i and car model p of division j. Any car model should 
have this intra-firm divisional distance with each division of the same firm. 
ijmNEWDIST  is the variable of interest, which captures the product distance between a 
new model m and sister division j. When model m is not a new one, this variable would 
have no value.  
In summation, since this study is concerned with the location of a car model vis-
à-vis its own division, sister divisions (of the same firm), and rival divisions, each car 
model should have three types of distances as defined in the above. And since the focus 
of this study is on the product location choice of new car models, only the distances be-
tween a new car model and existing products are included for analyses. 
 
Independent variables  
 
Intra-firm divisional status (STATUS) Prior studies have measured that at 
the organizational level the status of a firm is identified by its position in the network of 
organizations (e.g., Podolny, 1993, 1994), which is the standard measure for relational 
data on status suggested by Bonacich (1987). This study defined the status of a division 
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as the division’s relative standing in the economic, political, and prestige hierarchies. 
According to the literature on status (Podolny, 1993, 1994; Benoit-Smullyan, 1944), 
these three dimensions of status are intertwined since each reinforces one another, even 
though each dimension is a distinct one. For example, economic status would bring in 
political power, or vice versa. And political power could bring in prestige. This suggests 
that one dimension of status could capture the essence of status. Based on this, the status 
of a division was measured on the economic dimension: economic status. 
The usual measure of economic status for an individual has been her income. 
Analogous to this traditional measure at the division level would be each division’s in-
come. Specifically, this study argues that the economic status of a division would be de-
termined by how much that division contributes to overall firm performance. Ideally this 
should be measured by the division’s contribution to overall firm profits. But due to data 
availability, each division’s contribution to overall firm performance or profits was 
measured by its contribution to overall firm revenues (i.e., each division’s total revenue 
divided by overall firm revenues). Each division’s revenue was calculated by multiply-
ing the number of units sold by the base price of each model in a given year. 
 
Inter-firm divisional overlap (OVERLAPir) The literature on competitive 
dynamics suggests that the same absolute level of market overlap between any two or-
ganizations could be considered different depending on each organization’s scope of 
market domains. For example, the same level of market overlap between organizations 
A and B (say 10 markets) could be huge for A which operates in 20 markets, whereas 
the overlap could be not so serious for B which operates in 100 markets. That is, market 
overlap is asymmetric. So the measure of divisional overlap should be able to reflect this 
asymmetry. 
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To meet this constraint, I calculated the degree of inter-firm divisional overlap 
(i.e., the degree of divisional overlap between a focal division and a rival division of a 
competing firm) using Sohn’s (2001) formula for niche overlap measure. This measure 
appropriately handles the patterns of dominance and unequal overlap between two firms. 
Using data on patient origins of six hospitals in Los Angeles area, Sohn demonstrated 
that symmetric measures such as Euclidian distance (e.g., Burt, 1992; Burt and Talmud, 
1993), cosine of the angle (e.g., Pianka, 1973), and alpha coefficient (MacArthur and 
Levins, 1967) did not adequately capture the patterns of dominance and unequal overlap 
between two compared firms.  
Inter-firm divisional overlap between focal division i and rival division r was 
measured using Sohn’s (2001) competition coefficient measure. Specifically I used the 
following formula (see Equations 6 and 7 in Sohn (2001) for more detail). 
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Here ir OVERLAP  represents the degree of inter-firm divisional overlap be-
tween focal division i and rival division r; this measure captures the level of com-
petitive pressure that the focal division receives from the divisional domain overlap 
with division r. The value is asymmetric (i.e.,  riir OVERLAPOVERLAP ≠ ), which is 
one of the advantages that this measure has over other traditional measures. 
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ir OVERLAP takes the value between 0 and 1; the higher the value, the more focal 
division i receives competitive pressure from the overlap with rival division r. 
As shown in the above formula, Pin equals to the total sales volume ($) of di-
vision i in market segment n. From the standpoint of population ecology, Pin repre-
sents resource utilization levels of division i at resource segment n.21 I used the clas-
sification of market class or segment (resource segment for population ecology ter-
minology) done by Ward’s Automotive Yearbook for each year.22 
  
Intra-firm divisional overlap (OERLAPij) Intra-firm divisional overlap (i.e., 
the degree of divisional overlap between focal division i and another division j of the 
same firm) was also measured using Sohn’s (2001) competition coefficient measure. 
Thus, the variable intra-firm divisional overlap is calculated as follows. 
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Here  OVERLAP  ij represents the degree of divisional overlap that focal divi-
sion i has with division j of the same firm and captures the level of competitive pres-
sure from the divisional domain overlap with division j. As is  OVERLAPir , 
 OVERLAP  ij is not symmetric either (i.e.,  ji ij OVERLAP OVERLAP ≠ ). And 
                                                
21 In this respect, the current measure is better than the one suggested by McPherson (1983). McPherson’s 
(1983) measure captures the asymmetric nature of niche overlap between two organizations, but it ignores 
resource utilization levels at each resource position (Sohn, 2001). 
22 Here the market segment classification is critical in determining the level of divisional domain overlap. 
The underlying assumption for this measure is that car models that belong to the same market segment are 
direct competitors to one another. The classification is the outcome of various considerations such as 
price, product characteristics, target customers, marketing intent, among others. In a phone conversation, a 
representative from Ward’s Automotive Yearbook confirmed that car models in the same market segment 
are direct competitors. 
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 ijOVERLAP takes the value between 0 and 1; the higher the value, the more focal 
division i receives competitive pressure from the overlap with division j of the same 
firm.  
 
Competitive uncertainty (COMPUN) Many scholars have suggested dif-
ferent ways of describing environments (e.g., Thompson, 1967; March and Simon, 1958; 
Dess and Beard, 1984). These different ways of describing environments could be classi-
fied into three categories: complexity, instability or dynamism, and resource availability 
(Sharfman and Dean, 1991). Here competitive uncertainty perceived by a firm is primar-
ily concerned with the instability or dynamism in the part of the market where the firm is 
actively operating (i.e., the rate of unpredictable environmental change).  
One way to capture the stability or dynamism in the part of the market where the 
firm is actively operating is to check the change in market shares of each model that be-
longs to the firm (cf. Klein, 1977). Wide swings in market share from the previous year 
to the current year imply a high level of rivalry in that part of the market where the firm 
offers its products and competes with rival products. For example, firms that only offer 
high-end products (e.g., luxury cars) would not be concerned with the intense competi-
tion and instability in the low-end market as firms offering low-end products (e.g., small 
cars) should be. Based on this reasoning, I measured the competitive uncertainty that a 
firm feels as follows.23 
 
∑=
m
1-tfm,fmtft MS - MS COMPUN  
                                                
23 The formula is basically an adaptation of Klein (1977). 
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Here COMPUNft denotes the competitive uncertainty of firm f at year t; MSfmt 
denotes the market share of model m of firm f at year t, which equals to the number of 
units sold of car model m divided by the total number of units sold in the market. The 
higher the value, the higher competitive uncertainty is in a given year for firm f.   
   
Density of a division (DENSITY) One of the predictions of this study is that 
the density of a division would affect its decision on new product location vis-à-vis the 
products of a rival division. The density of a division should capture how closely each 
model is located to one another in the division. To reflect this idea, I measured the den-
sity by taking the average of the Euclidean distances of any two car models in the same 
division as follows.   
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Here DENSITYi denotes the level of density of division i. And X refers to the to-
tal number of products of division i. Pxk refers to the value of k-th product characteristic 
of product x. And after having calculated the mean distance among all products (car 
models) of the same division, the value was multiplied by (-1) for the sake of easy inter-
pretation. The higher the value, the more crowded a division’s domain is. 
 
Compensation scheme (EXECCOMP) Following the suggestion of prior 
studies (e.g., Mitchell and Silver, 1990; Hambrick, 1994), I used the proportion of top 
executives’ compensations tied to overall firm performance as a proxy to measure the 
orientation of corporate headquarters in facilitating the cooperation among divisions in 
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the firm. Consistent with prior studies on executive compensation (Balkin, Markman, & 
Gomez-Mejia, 2000; Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998), I weighted the total values of stock op-
tions by 0.25. Specifically the following formula was used for creating the measure as 
suggested.  
 
 .
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Compensation scheme of firm f (EXECCOMP) is basically the average propor-
tion of the total value of stock options across the executives commanding the five high-
est compensations in the firm. Here e refers to individual executive and M denotes the 
total number of executives whose compensation information is included in the calcula-
tion (M is usually 5). The higher the value, the stronger the firm is oriented to increasing 
overall firm performance. 
 
Status difference (STATUSDIFF) Status difference compares the difference 
between two divisions that belong to the same firm. I calculated this measure by sub-
tracting the status of focal division i from that of division j of the same firm. Thus, the 
higher the value, the lower the status of focal division i compared with division j.  
 
Control variables  
 
No. of division products (DIVPRODS) To capture the potential for econo-
mies of scope in producing and marketing a new car model, this study includes a vari-
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able for the total number of car models offered by a division. The higher the potential for 
economies of scope, it is expected that (1) divisions are more likely to introduce a new 
car model in the first place; and (2) in case of new car model introduction, divisions are 
more likely to locate their products closer to their own products. 
No. of other divisions’ products (SISPRODS) To capture the potential for 
economies of scope of a division with other divisions of the same firm (i.e., sister divi-
sions) in producing and marketing a new car model, this study includes the number of 
models offered by sister divisions of the same firm. 
No. of rival products (RIVPRODS) If there are many rival products, this would 
increase the potential for competition, which may affect a division’s new product loca-
tion choice. 
Trend (TREND) A trend variable was included to capture any systematic 
effects of trend. This variable was calculated by subtracting ‘1977’ from the year in the 
observation.  
 
In addition to the above listed variables for testing the hypotheses, the following 
variables were also created to obtain the inverse of Mill’s ratio from probit estimation. 
This inverse of Mills’ ratio was plugged into the main equations with the variables de-
fined in the above.  
 
New product introduction (NEWMODEL) This is the dependent vari-
able for probit estimation and is a binary variable. This variable was coded 1 when a new 
car model was introduced; otherwise this variable was coded as 0. As mentioned in the 
previous section, it is assumed that a car model is a new one if it meets one of the two 
conditions: (1) it bears a new name that didn’t appear in previous years; or (2) its horse-
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power, width, length, and wheelbase change more than 10 percent in comparison with a 
model bearing the same name in the previous year. 
Total number of products (MKTPRODS)  This variable represents the 
total number of products (here car models) sold in the market in a given year. This vari-
able was included as a proxy for the level of competition in the market. It is assumed 
that where there are many car models in the market, the potential for intense competitive 
would be high: the higher the value, the greater the level of (potential) competition is. 
Thus, it is expected that a high level of competition would lessen the possibility of new 
car model introduction in the first place. 
Division size (DIVSIZE) This size variable represents the total number of 
units sold by a division for each year. This variable was included as a proxy for variable 
profits for a division (cf. Thomas and Weigelt, 2000). This variable was log-
transformed. 
Firm size (FIRMSIZE) To capture the potential for resource support from 
corporate headquarters, firm size was included as a control variable. It is assumed that 
firms with larger size will be better off providing resources for any innovative new 
product introduction, thus affect product location choice. However, it should be noted 
that there has been no agreement over the impact of firm size on innovation. This vari-
able was log-transformed. 
Fixed cost (FIXCOST) This variable is a proxy for fixed cost for car pro-
duction. Following Thomas and Weigelt (2000), this variable was measured by dividing 
the market size ($) by the total number of models for each year. This is a good proxy for 
fixed costs for a monopolistically competitive industry like the U.S. automobile industry 
(Thomas and Weigelt, 2000; cf. Salop, 1979). So it is expected that high a fixed cost 
would lead to a reduction in new product introductions.  
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Statistical Methods 
 
Instrumental variable (IV) estimation 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, I measured the product distance of any two 
car models by taking the absolute difference between their respective utility. And to cre-
ate the utility index for each car model, I estimated the following equation which was 
adapted from Berry, et al. (1995) and Thomas and Weigelt (2000).   
 
(4.3)                                  
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MPG stands for miles per gallon; and share represents market share of a model 
in terms of units sold. The dependent variable in the equation is log-transformed price. 
Since the price represents base price, options such as power windows are not included in 
the equation. (Descriptive statistics of the variables in equation (4.3) are reported in Ta-
ble 1 at Appendix B.) 
The specification of equation (4.3) makes OLS estimation inappropriate. The 
variable mtSHARE  in equation (4.3) poses the problem of endogeneity, which would 
make OLS estimates inconsistent. Here the endogeneity comes from two sources: omit-
ted variables and simultaneity. First, there could be product characteristics that affect 
market share, but were omitted in the current equation due to data availability. These 
characteristics could include such considerations as prestige or reputation. Since these 
unobserved product characteristics are correlated with market share and are lumped to-
gether in the error term, market share and the error term are correlated. Second, there is 
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an issue of simultaneity between market share and price. One of the key determinants of 
demand (i.e., market share) is the price, and vice versa. 
To address the problem of endogeneity, I used instrumental variable (IV) estima-
tion to obtain consistent estimates. The instruments for this estimation should have two 
properties: (1) the instruments should not be correlated with the error term mtε ; and (2) 
they should be correlated with market share. According to Wooldridge (2002), asymp-
totically we are always better off including more instruments, thus I included the instru-
ments that had been used either by Berry, et al. (1995) or Thomas and Weigelt (2000). 
First, I included each of the five product attributes of a car model as instruments (five in-
struments); sums of each product attribute of the other cars of the same division (five in-
struments); sums of each product attribute cross all the rival cars (five instruments). Sec-
ond, to take into account the potential economies of scale and scope of own firm and ri-
val firms, I included the number of own-firm products and rival-firm products as instru-
ments. Third, I also added the average values of each product attribute cross all models 
as instruments since these values affect a firm’s cost (Thomas and Weigelt, 2000). 
 
Heckman’s two-step estimation 
 
To model a division’s new product location choice and test the hypotheses, I 
used Heckman’s two-step estimation (or Heckit estimator). Heckman’s two-step estima-
tion has merits in this study over Thomas and Weigelt’s (2000) logistic regression analy-
ses. First, new car models that we observe are there in the first place because they have 
met certain requirements of the division and the firm. Thus, we could regard these new 
models were selected by its offering division and firm out of potential distribution of 
models. This calls for a correction for a potential sample selection bias. Second, this 
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study is concerned with the variation between new product distances as a function of 
divisionalization and cannibalization. By using Heckman’s two-step estimation, we can 
put the dependent variable at the left-hand-side of the equation, rather than put it in the 
right-hand-side with a binary variable as a dependent variable for new product introduc-
tion. Heckman selection model is composed of two related models: regression model and 
selection model.24  
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The basic assumption in the Heckman model is that the left-hand-side variable in 
the regression model (here *iy ) is observed based on the value of the LHS variable in the 
selection model (here *iz ). More specifically *iy  is observed only when *iz  > 0 (then 
=iy *iy ). 
The errors are assumed to be bivariate normal as shown in the above. Note that 
the variance of iν  is assumed to be 1. This is because the variance cannot be estimated: 
the selection variable *iz  is not usually observable, and we can only infer its sign but not 
its magnitude. Since the error term in the selection model is assumed to be normally dis-
tributed, selection model specifies a probit model where iz =1 when *iz  > 0. The 
correlation coefficient ρ shows whether the two equations are independent of each other. 
                                                
24 The notations and explanations for Heckman’s two-step estimation are from Greene (2000: 926-937) 
and Long (1997: 215-216). For Heckman’s own treatment of this topic, please see Heckman (1979). 
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lation coefficient ρ shows whether the two equations are independent of each other. And 
the covariance is ερσ , which captures the magnitude and direction of selectivity effects. 
Heckman’s two-step estimation procedure is as follows (Heckman, 1979). First, 
obtain probit estimates in the selection model (here 
∧
α ), and using these estimates, com-
pute the inverse Mills ratio (or nonselection hazard) for each observation in the selected 
sample. 25 Second, augment the regression model with the computed inverse Mills ratio, 
and obtain the estimates by OLS estimation. The expected value of the observed iy in the 
regression model could be expressed as follows (Greene, 2000: 930). 
 
[ ] .λρσ  1E εii zy i⋅+== βx i  
 
The above expression suggests that sample selection problem could be regarded 
as an omitted variable problem, which is why OLS estimates are not consistent 
(Heckman, 1979). In sum, in the first step, obtain the probit estimates (
∧
α ) and then 
compute the inverse Mills ratio (
∧
iλ ).26 And in the second step, estimate β and ερσ by 
OLS regression on x and 
∧
iλ . Note that when variable k belongs to both regression and 
selection equations, it has both direct and indirect effects on the mean value of iy . The 
direct effect of the variable is captured by ikβ and the indirect effect is channeled by its 
presence in iλ .  
                                                
25 Here inverse Mills ratio essentially captures the effect of truncation on the expected value of the trun-
cated variable. As the area of truncation in the distribution gets smaller, inverse Mills ratio gets closer to 0 
and the expected value of the truncated variable gets closer to the true mean, i.e., the effect of truncation 
diminishes (Long, 1997: 195-196). 
26 

Φ


=
∧∧∧
αwαw iii φλ . Here the numerator is the density function for a standard normal variable 
and the denominator is the distribution function. This inverse Mills ratio is “a monotone function decreas-
ing function of the probability that an observation is selected into the sample” (Heckman, 1979: 156).  
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Following the steps laid out in Heckman (1979), the following probit equation 
was estimated to obtain the inverse Mills ratio. This equation is a selection equation for 
regression equations. 
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After having obtained the inverse Mills ratio using equation (4.4), I estimated 
three main equations with the calculated inverse Mills ratio included. Each equation cor-
responds to one of the three aspects of the product location of a new car model offered 
by division i: (1) intra-divisional new product distance (ii) − the distance between the 
new model and a car model that belongs to the same division i and that has the shortest 
distance with the new model; (2) inter-firm divisional new product distance (ir) − the 
distance between the new model and a rival car model that belongs to rival division r 
and that has the shortest distance with the new model in that rival division; and (3) intra-
firm divisional new product distance (ij) − the distance between the new model and a sis-
ter car model that belongs to division j of the same firm to which division i belongs and 
that has the shortest distance with the new model in that division.  
First, the following equation was used to model intra-divisional product distance 
(ii) and test Hypotheses 1 & 2. The unit of analysis for this equation is model-year.  
 
(4.5)                  
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Basically equation (4.5) is a regression equation whereas equation (4.4) is its se-
lection equation. If there is a selection effect, the coefficient of inverse Mills ration 
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would be statistically significant. Car model-specific random effects GLS estimation was 
used to obtain the estimates for hypothesis testing. 
Second, to model inter-firm divisional product distance (ir) and test Hypotheses 3 
& 4, the following equation was used. The unit of analysis for the following equation is 
inter-firm division dyad-model-year. An observation is indexed as irmt, where ir is a di-
vision dyad between focal division i and rival division r; m is a car model of focal divi-
sion i; and t refers to year. 
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Equation (4.6) is a regression equation and equation (4.4) is its selection equa-
tion. Note that the measure capturing the degree of inter-firm divisional overlap is not 
symmetric (i.e., fritfirt overlapoverlap ≠ ). To obtain the estimates, I used car model-
specific random effects GLS estimation. Since new models are included in multiple 
times due to the dyadic nature of the specification, each in reference to a rival division in 
question, the observations with the same new model are not independent of each other. 
For example, let’s say a division has 5 rival divisions. Then, whenever this division in-
troduces a new model, this model is included 5 times vis-à-vis each rival division. So it 
is necessary to let the residuals of the observations with the same new model correlate 
with each other. Car model-specific random-effects GLS estimation addresses this non-
independence among the observations with the same new model. 
Third, to model intra-firm divisional distance or inter-divisional distance (ij) and 
test Hypotheses 5 through 8, equation (4.7) was estimated. The unit of analysis for this 
equation is intra-firm division dyad-model-year. An observation is indexed as ijmt, 
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where ij is a division dyad between focal division i and sister division j of the same firm 
(ij); m is a car model of focal division i; and t refers to year. 
 
(4.7)                         
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Equation (4.7) is a regression equation and equation (4.4) is its selection equa-
tion. Note that the measures capturing the degree of intra-firm divisional overlap and 
status difference between two compared divisions are not symmetric (i.e., 
fjitfijt overlapoverlap ≠ , fjitfijt statusdiffstatusdiff ≠ ). To obtain the estimates, I used car 
model-specific random effects GLS estimation. Since new models are included in multi-
ple times, each in reference to a sister division in question, the observations with the 
same new model are not independent of each other. So it is necessary to let the residuals 
of these observations correlate with each other, which is what car model-specific ran-
dom-effects GLS estimation is supposed to address. 
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CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
 
This chapter reports the results of preliminary and main estimations, and pro-
vides proper interpretations of the results. First, the results of instrumental variable (IV) 
estimation and probit estimation are reported. IV estimation was done to obtain consis-
tent estimates of product attributes, which were later used to construct the scalar utility 
index of each car model. The scalar utility index of each car model was, in turn, used to 
calculate the distance of any pair of car models. Probit estimates were obtained to calcu-
late the inverse Mills ratio which was plugged in the regression equations for hypotheses 
testing. 
Second, the results on the intra-divisional product distance are reported. Here I 
report the effects of divisional status and competitive uncertainty felt by a firm on a divi-
sion’s new product location choice vis-à-vis its own existing products (here car models). 
Third, this chapter reports the results on the inter-firm divisional product distance. Here 
this study is interested in whether the degree of a focal division’s inter-firm divisional 
overlap with a rival division affects this focal division’s new product location choice vis-
à-vis the rival division’s products. In addition to this, this chapter also reports whether 
the density of the focal division has moderating effects on the aforementioned relation-
ship. Fourth, this chapter reports the results on the intra-firm divisional product distance. 
Here I report whether inter-divisional domain overlap would affect a division’s new 
product location choice vis-à-vis its sister division’s products. I also report whether there 
exist moderating roles of divisional status and executive compensation on the aforemen-
tioned relationship. In addition to these, it is also reported whether status difference 
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makes a significant impact on product location choice vis-à-vis sister divisions’ prod-
ucts. 
 
Instrumental Variable (IV) Estimation and Probit Estimation 
 
Instrumental variable (IV) estimation 
 
The very first step for the analyses is to construct a scalar utility index for each 
car model so that we can calculate the distance between any two car models by simply 
comparing their respective utility indexes. To create a scalar index for utility, I obtained 
the coefficients of each product attribute using IV estimator.  
Table 1 summarizes descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients of the log 
price of a car, its product dimensions, market share, and trend variable (See Appendix 
B). The mean of log-transformed price of a car is 9.42, which is around $12,333 (1983 
constant dollars). The average market share of a car model in a given year is 0.6%. The 
correlation coefficients confirm some of our common experiences. For example, the 
negative correlation coefficient between trend and market share suggests that market 
share of each car has decreased as time went on in the past, which may be due to in-
creased competition. The coefficient between trend and mile per gallon (MPG) suggests 
that, in general, overall MPG may not have increased in the past twenty something years. 
Total number of observations for IV estimation is 3,379.  
Table 2 reports the results of instrumental variable (IV) estimation on the log-
transformed price of a car model using the specification of equation (4.3) (See Appendix 
B). Note that the price was adjusted using Consumer Price Index. In the table, two sets 
of coefficients are reported for comparison: IV estimation coefficients and OLS coeffi-
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cients. And each set of coefficients includes two versions of coefficients: raw and stan-
dardized coefficients. Standard errors are in the parentheses. The Hausman test at the 
bottom of the table shows that there exist systematic differences between the IV esti-
mates and OLS estimates (p<.01), suggesting that IV estimation is consistent but OLS 
estimation is not. Henceforth I will focus on the interpretation of the IV estimates and 
will use them in calculating a car model’s utility index. 
The results in Table 2 show that wheel base and length of a car are statistically 
significant and positive in sign, suggesting that the longer the wheelbase and length of a 
car, the higher the price of that car model. These results are consistent with common ex-
pectations in the sense that luxury cars are usually longer than compact or lower class 
cars. And width was found to have a negative and statistically significant impact on the 
price, of which the result is a bit tricky to interpret. In hedonic pricing, it is usually the 
case that product attributes would have positive coefficients. The coefficient of horse-
power confirms our expectation that cars with high horsepower are more expensive. 
Mile per gallon (MPG) that measures the level of fuel efficiency, however, was not 
found to be statistically significant. Trend variable shows that the price has increased in 
the past. Its coefficient indicates that the price has increase 0.7% each year during the re-
search window. And the coefficient of market share suggests that car models with high 
market share usually have lower prices, which is not surprising. Note that here market 
share is based on units sold. 
To compare the relative impact of each product attribute on the (log-transformed) 
price, the table also includes standardized coefficients. The results basically show that 
each dimension has a different impact on the price. The coefficients show that horse-
power has the largest impact on price: one standard deviation increase in horse power 
would result in 0.6037 standard deviation increase in the price of a car model, when 
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other things were held constant. This magnitude of impact of horsepower on the price is 
three times larger than that of length which has the second largest coefficient (0.1782, 
p<.01). And wheel base has the magnitude of 0.0982, suggesting that one standard 
deviation increase in wheel base would result in the increase of log price by 0.0982 stan-
dard deviation. The attribute width also has very significant impact on the price, this 
time, negatively. Literally the coefficient says that if the width of a car gets wider by one 
standard deviation, the log price of the car would decrease by 0.087 standard deviation. 
This result is not consistent with our common experience, which is intriguing. 
The coefficients of each product attribute were used in constructing the scalar 
utility index of each car model. Figure 5.1 through Figure 5.4 present the utility indexes 
of car models offered by major U.S. and Japanese automobile companies in 1996 (See 
Appendix A). Car models offered by the same division are included in a rectangular box 
with the division name; this rectangular box also represents the division’s divisional do-
main. Note that the utility index is one-dimensional and is represented as a vertical axis, 
which is not shown in the figures. The higher the vertical position of a car is, the higher 
the utility of the car is. Thus, Crown Victoria has the highest utility among cars offered 
by Ford Division in 1996. Figure 5.2 depicts that Chevrolet Division (CV) has a very 
large divisional domain, whereas Dodge Division (DG) has a focused divisional domain 
with high level of divisional density (i.e., low product distances among models in the 
same box). Figure 5.3 compares GM and two Japanese companies, Toyota and Honda. 
Unlike GM, these two companies cover the market with two divisions: one for car mod-
els with higher utilities and the other for lower utilities; thus, not much overlap between 
the divisions of the same firm. 
The utility indexes of car models were, in turn, used in calculating new product 
distances. For example, Cadillac (CA) introduced Catera in 1996. Casual inspection in-
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dicates that, for the new model Catera, intra-divisional new product distance is the utility 
difference between itself and Eldora (i.e., shortest distance in the same division); intra-
firm divisional new product distance vis-à-vis Buick Division (Olsmobile Division) is 
the utility difference between itself and Le Sabre (Ols 88); and inter-firm divisional new 
product distance vis-à-vis Toyota Division of Toyota is the utility difference between it-
self and Supra. These new product distances become the dependent variables for the 
main analyses. 
 
Probit estimation 
 
The results related to probit analysis are reported in Table 3 and Table 4 (See 
Appendix B). Table 3 reports descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients of the 
variables. The table shows that there have been 163 new model introductions by firms 
with multiple divisions between 1979 and 1999. Note that the total number of observa-
tions is 4,996, which is different from the number 3,379 in Table 1. This is due to two 
reasons. First, it is because the probit analysis only included models that were offered by 
firms with multiple divisions, whereas IV estimation is based on all the models offered 
between 1979 and 1999 regardless of whether offering firms had multiple divisions. The 
exclusion of models offered by single-division firms reduced the number of observations 
to 2,323. Second, it is because, to meet a basic assumption of event history method, I ex-
panded each model included in 2,323 observations so that each model is present during 
the research window (i.e., from 1979 to 1999). For example, if a model was introduced 
in 1985, this model is supposed to have value 1 for the variable NEWMODEL (which is 
a binary variable for new product introduction) in 1985 and 0 for the years between 1986 
and 1999. In this case there is no observation for this model between 1979 and 1984. To 
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take care of this issue, I inserted observations for this model between 1979 and 1984 
with the value of 0 for the variable NEWMODEL. In so far as the division that intro-
duced this model is present during the period, these newly inserted observations should 
have values for division-level, firm-level, and market-level variables. 
Table 4 reports probit estimates from equation (4.4). The results show that the 
number of division products (DIVPRODS) has a positive and statistically significant im-
pact on the likelihood of new car model introduction (0.0339, p<.05), which may suggest 
the consideration of economies of scope in new model introduction (cf. Thomas and 
Weigelt, 2000). The coefficient of the variable for fixed cost in a given year (FIXCOST) 
is negative and statistically significant (-0.0006, p<.01), which is consistent with the ex-
pectation that high fixed cost would more likely to restrict new model introductions. Size 
variables were found to have different impacts on the likelihood of new model introduc-
tions. Table 4 shows that firm size (FIRMSIZE) has a positive, but marginal, impact on 
the likelihood of new model introductions. However, the result on division size 
(DIVSIZE) suggests that large divisions are less likely to introduce new models. 
As explained in the previous chapter, the estimates in Table 4 were used in calcu-
lating the inverse Mills ratio for each uncensored observation. The total number of ob-
served observations, i.e., uncensored observations is 163. These observations constitute 
the base data set for the main analyses. 
 
Divisional Status and New Product Location Choice 
 
Table 5 reports the descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients for the im-
pact of divisional status and competitive uncertainty on a division’s new product loca-
tion vis-à-vis its own existing car models (See Appendix A). The total number of obser-
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vations is 163, which represents the new model introductions the U.S. market between 
1979 and 1999 by automobile companies who operated multiple divisions and sold 
automobiles in the U.S. 
Even though it is not reported in Table 5, it is worth mentioning the descriptive 
statistics of the utility index of each car offered by firms with multiple divisions during 
the research window. The value ranges from 1 to 3.68 with the mean value of 1.88, 
which suggests that a substantial portion of car models are located in the lower part in 
the one-dimensional product space. And the table also reports the descriptive statistics of 
intra-division new product distance ( imNEWDIST ). Its mean value is 0.11, which is quite 
small relative to the range of the utility index, which is 2.68. This may suggest that a di-
vision locates its new product quite close to its existing products to exploit capabilities 
(cf. Thomas and Weigelt, 2000). 
Correlation coefficients in Table 5 show that the number of own division’s car 
models (DIVPRODS), the number of rival products (RIVPRODS), density of division 
(DENSITY), inverse Mills ratio (LAMBDA), and status of division (STATUS) have 
negative correlations with a division’s intra-division new product distance. LAMBDA 
has values ranging from 1.38 to 2.76 with the mean value of 2.18. Note that except for 
TREND, LAMBDA, and NEWDIST, all other variables were mean-centered for obtain-
ing correlation coefficients and regression estimates to alleviate potential multicollinear-
ity problems and to make the interpretation of regression estimates easy.  
Table 6 presents the results of random-effects GLS estimation of equation (4.5) 
on intra-division new product distances (See Appendix B). The two columns, at the 
right-hand-side of the main variables of interest, represent hypotheses and their expected 
signs. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Model 1 is a baseline model that only includes control variables. The coefficient 
of the number of own division’s car models (DIVPRODS) is negative and statistically 
significant (-0.0146, p<.01); and the coefficient of the number of sister models 
(SISPRODS) is positive and statistically significant (0.002, p<.1). And the coefficient of 
the density of a division (DENSITY) shows that the more crowded a division, the closer 
a new car model is located to its own division’s existing models (-0.5114, p<.01), which 
is not consistent with the argument of product cannibalization that a division is less 
likely to introduce a new model that is a close substitute for its own division’s existing 
products, especially when the division already has models that are quite close to one an-
other. The coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio (LAMBDA) is negative and statistically 
significant (-0.2238, p<.01), suggesting the existence of selection or selectivity effects. 
The sign and magnitude of the coefficient implies that the larger the effect of truncation 
(i.e., the larger the area of truncation in the distribution), the shorter the distance of a 
new product vis-à-vis its own division’s existing products becomes by 0.22 per unit 
change. 
Model 2 introduces the status of a division (STATUS) to examine whether 
STATUS would have a positive and statistically significant impact on intra-divisional 
new product distance (Hypothesis 1). The coefficient is not statistically significant, thus 
Hypothesis 1 was rejected.27 Note that there still exists selection effect, i.e., the variable 
LAMBDA has a statistically significant coefficient (-0.264, p<.01). 
Models 3.1 and 3.2 were constructed to test Hypothesis 2.28 Hypothesis 2 posits 
that when the competitive environments that surround a firm are highly uncertain or in-
                                                
27 As stated, the variables of interest were mean-centered, which would make interpretation much easier, 
especially in the case of interaction terms. 
28 Note that due to some missing observations of the variable competitive uncertainty (COMPUN), total 
number of observations is different from previous models. 
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stable, i.e., when competitive uncertainty (COMPUN) is high, the expected effect of a 
division’s status would be more pronounced. This is because the firm would be more 
likely to rely on higher-status division(s) for its future performance since these divisions 
have demonstrated their abilities to perform in the past. Thus, the firm would allocate 
more resources to its higher-status division(s), which in turn may allow these divisions 
to introduce a new product that could be far different from their existing products. Model 
3.1 only includes COMPUN and examines its main effect. The coefficient is not signifi-
cant. Model 3.2 introduces an interaction term between STATUS and COMPUN to test 
the moderating effect of COMPUN. The coefficient of the interaction term is not statisti-
cally significant. Thus, Hypothesis 2 didn’t receive support. And note that the variable 
LAMBDA is no longer statistically significant, indicating the absence of selection ef-
fects. 
The estimates reported in Table 6 are obtained by car model-specific random-
effects GLS estimation of equation (4.5). To check whether the estimates would have 
been different if fixed-effects estimation had been used, I did a Hausman specification 
test on Model 3.2. The test results show that the random-effects estimates are not sys-
tematically different from the fixed-effects estimates (χ2=6.81, df=9; p=.65). And it 
should be noted that the selection effects across models is not stable or consistent as 
shown in the table, suggesting that sample selection might not be a serious issue for the 
estimation of equation (4.5). 
In summation, the results in Table 6 show that Hypotheses 1 & 2 didn’t receive 
support, at least from the current sample. The results didn’t provide support for the idea 
that a division’s status would allow the division to introduce a new product (here car 
model) farther away from its existing products. And the idea that the competitive uncer-
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tainty felt by the firm would positively moderate the before-mentioned relationship 
didn’t receive support either.  
  
Inter-firm Divisional Domain Overlap and New Product Location Choice 
 
Here the focus is to investigate a division’s new product location choice vis-à-vis 
a rival division’s products. Specifically this study is concerned with how the degree of 
divisional domain overlap between a focal division and a rival division would affects the 
focal division’s new product location choice vis-à-vis the rival division’s products. Here 
the results of Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4 are reported. The unit of analysis for the 
data set to test these hypotheses is inter-firm division dyad(ir)-model(m)-year(t) and the 
total number of observations for the data set is 1,780.  
Table 7 reports the descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients of the data 
(See Appendix B). The coefficients are pairwise in nature. The dependent variable inter-
firm divisional new product distance ( irmNEWDIST ) has the mean value of 0.155, which 
is larger than the mean 0.108 of intra-divisional new product distance ( imNEWDIST ). 
This implies that, in general, divisions are more likely to locate their new products far-
ther away from rival products than from their own products, i.e., they differentiate their 
new products farther away from rival products than from their own products. 
The correlation coefficients show some interesting results. The number of one’s 
own division products (DIVPRODS) and the number of sister divisions’ products 
(SISPRODS) have negative and significant correlations with the dependent variable (-
0.17 and -0.12 respectively), indicating that high numbers of DIVPRODS and 
SISPRODS are correlated with low product differentiation with rival products (here car 
models). The variables of interest ( irOVERLAP and DENSITY) also have statistically 
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significant and negative correlations with the dependent variable. And the magnitudes of 
correlation coefficients suggest that multicollinearity would not be a serious issue, which 
is partly due to mean-centering of the variables. 
Table 8 reports the results of car model-specific random-effects GLS estimation 
of equation (4.6) on inter-firm divisional new product distance ( irmNEWDIST ) (See Ap-
pendix B). Model 4 is a baseline model and only includes control variables. The number 
of sister models (SISPRODS) has negative and statistically significant coefficient (-
.0021, p<.05), which implies that a focal division with average number of sister models 
would locate its new model closer to rival models, i.e., less product differentiation from 
rival models. Specifically the coefficient suggests that if a focal division has one more 
sister model than the average (which is 13.5), then this focal division’s inter-firm divi-
sional new product distance would decrease by 0.0021 (which is about 1.4% of the aver-
age inter-firm divisional new product distance). And the coefficient of the number of a 
division’s own models (DIVPRODS) is negative and statistically significant (-0.0075, 
p<.01). These might be due to the focal division’s motivation to avoid intra-divisional 
and inter-divisional product cannibalization. And trend variable (TREND) was found to 
have a positive impact on the dependent variable (0.0075, p<.01), suggesting that divi-
sions have located its new models farther away from their rival models in recent years 
than in the past, i.e., more product differentiation from rival models recently. 
Model 5 includes the variable irOVERLAP  to test Hypothesis 3. This hypothesis 
posits that a division with higher degree of inter-firm divisional overlap vis-à-vis a rival 
division is more likely to locate its new product closer to that rival division’s divisional 
domain. The coefficient is statistically significant and the sign is consistent with the ex-
pectation (-0.1615, p<.01). Thus, Hypothesis 3 did receive support. The sign and magni-
tude of the coefficient indicate that when a division’s degree of inter-firm divisional 
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overlap increases by one standard deviation (which is 0.32) from the average level of 
overlap, then the division’s inter-firm divisional new product distance would decrease by 
33.3% (=0.32*-0.1615/0.155) of the average distance.  
Model 6.1 and Model 6.2 introduce the variable for divisional density 
(DENSITY) and test its moderating effect. Model 6.1 introduces the variable. The coef-
ficient is negative and statistically significant (-0.1219, p<.01), suggesting that the higher 
the density of a division, the closer the division would locate its new model to rival 
models, i.e., less product differentiation from rival models. The sign and magnitude of 
the coefficient indicate that when a division’s level of density increases by one standard 
deviation (which is 0.12) from the average density, the division’s inter-firm divisional 
new product distance would decrease by 9.7% of the average distance. 
Model 6.2 introduces an interaction term to test Hypothesis 4. This hypothesis 
posits that a high level of the density of a division would strengthen the impact of inter-
firm divisional overlap on the division’s new product location choice vis-à-vis a rival di-
vision in question, i.e., the already negative impact would be more pronounced when the 
density is high. The coefficient is statistically significant, but the sign is not consistent 
with the prediction (0.3046, p<.01). The magnitude and sign of the coefficient indicate 
that one standard deviation increase of the level of density would decrease the magnitude 
of the coefficient of irOVERLAP  by 0.0375 [-0.1655 + 0.0375 (=0.123*0.3046)], which 
is the opposite of the prediction. Thus, Hypothesis 4 didn’t receive support. Figure 5.5 
depicts the moderating effect of divisional density on inter-firm divisional new product 
distance (See Appendix A).  
Figure 5.5 tells a different but interesting story of the moderating effect of divi-
sional density. Following conventions, two more slops were drawn by adding and sub-
tracting 1 standard deviation from the mean value of DENSITY, which is 0 (subscript M 
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represents the slop when DENSITY has the mean value; H depicts the slope of high den-
sity; and L for the slope of low density). The intercept term represents the situation when 
DIVPRODS, SISPRODS, and RIVPRODS are at their means (which is 0); and when 
TREND is at 10 (which is year 1988) and LAMBDA is at its mean (which is 2.21). Fig-
ure 5.5 shows that up to a certain level of irOVERLAP (0.384 to be exact) high density 
strengthens the effect of irOVERLAP  on inter-firm divisional new product distance; but 
beyond that point low density strengthens the effect. Note that irmNEWDIST should be 
greater than or equal to 0, thus the portion of its prediction that is below 0 has no real 
meaning or significance. 
The estimates reported in Table 8 are obtained by car model-specific random-
effects GLS estimation of equation (4.6). To check whether the estimates would have 
been different if fixed-effects estimation had been used, I did a Hausman specification 
test on Model 6.2. The test results show that the random-effects estimates are not sys-
tematically different from the fixed-effects estimates (χ2=1.55, df=2; p=.4608).29 And it 
should be noted that no selection effect was found for any model specification in Table 
8, suggesting that sample selection might not be a serious issue for the current estima-
tion. 
In summation, the results in Table 8 show that the current sample supports Hy-
pothesis 3, but not Hypothesis 4. It was found that the degree of inter-firm divisional 
overlap has a negative and statistically significant impact on a division’s decision to lo-
cate its new models vis-à-vis its rival division in question. The level of density, however, 
was not found to have an expected moderating effect on this relationship. It should be 
noted, however, that up to a certain level of inter-firm divisional overlap, high density 
                                                
29 Note that model df for the Hausman test is 2. This is because all the variables except for OVERLAP-
related variables were dropped in corresponding fixed-effects estimation.  
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has an expected moderating effect as shown in Figure 5.5. The results also show that the 
level of density has a main effect and this effect is consistent with the expectation (i.e., 
negative).  
 
Intra-firm Divisional Domain Overlap and New Product Location Choice 
 
Here the focus is to investigate how intra-firm divisional domain overlap or inter-
firm divisional domain overlap would affect a division’s new product location choice 
vis-à-vis its sister divisions of the same firm. Related to inter-divisional domain overlap, 
this study also tested the moderating effects of divisional status and a firm’s executive 
compensation scheme. And it was also examined whether disparity in status between 
two sister divisions would affect a focal division’s new product location choice behavior 
vis-à-vis the other. Specifically the results of Hypotheses 5 through 8 are reported here. 
The data set for testing these hypotheses has 297 observations and the unit of analysis 
for the equations is intra-firm division dyad(ij)-model(m)-year(t). 
Table 9 reports descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients (See Appendix 
B). The correlation coefficients are pairwise in nature. The dependent variable 
ijmNEWDIST has the mean value of 0.146, which is larger than 0.108 of intra-divisional 
new product distance ( imNEWDIST ) and a bit smaller than 0.155 of inter-firm divisional 
new product distance ( irmNEWDIST ). These results suggest that, in the U.S. automobile 
industry, on average, a division introduces a new model such that the new model is a bit 
more differentiated from rival models than from sister models (i.e., models offered by 
sister divisions of the same firm). And the descriptive statistics show that the mean value 
of intra-firm divisional overlap of a division ( ijOVERLAP ) is 0.345, which means that, 
on average, 34.5% of a division’s domain is overlapped with that of a sister division.  
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The dependent variable ijmNEWDIST has a negative and statistically significant 
correlation with intra-firm divisional overlap ( ijOVERLAP ), which is not consistent with 
the expectation. And the dependent variable also has a positive and statistically signifi-
cant correlation with an executive compensation scheme ( fEXECCOMP ) that highly 
emphasizes cooperation among divisions (0.17, p<.05), which is consistent with our ex-
pectation. And the magnitudes of correlation coefficients suggest that multicollinearity 
would not be a serious issue, which is partly due to mean-centering of the variables. 
Table 10 presents the results of car model-specific random-effects GLS estima-
tion of equation (4.7) on intra-firm divisional new product location choice (See Appen-
dix B). Model 7 is a baseline model for this part of the study and contains control vari-
ables. The coefficients of trend variable (TREND) and SISPRODS are statistically sig-
nificant, but these results are not stable as can be in the following models.  
Model 8 introduces the variable ijOVERLAP that captures the minimum distance 
between a new car model of focal division i and the car models of division j of the same 
firm. This model tests Hypothesis 5 which posits that division i with a higher level of di-
visional domain overlap with another division j of the same firm is more likely to locate 
its new product (i.e., new car model) farther away from the products of division j. The 
coefficient of ijOVERLAP  is significant (p<.01), but the sign is not consistent with the 
expectation. Thus, Hypothesis 5 was rejected. The coefficient suggests that, contrary to 
our expectation, a higher level of inter-divisional overlap would make a division locate 
its new model closer to a sister division, i.e., decreasing product differentiation from the 
models of a sister division in question. Specifically the sign and magnitude of the coeffi-
cient (-0.2379) indicate that one standard-deviation increase of intra-firm divisional do-
main overlap (which is 0.304) from its average level would result in 49.5% (0.304*-
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0.2379/0.146) decrease of the average new product distance vis-à-vis a sister division’s 
existing products in question. 
Model 9.1 and Model 9.2 introduce the variable STATUS and test its moderating 
role on the relationship between ijOVERLAP  and ijmNEWDIST . Hypothesis 6 predicts 
that a division’s status in the firm would weaken the impact of the degree of intra-firm 
divisional overlap on the division’s product location choice vis-à-vis the products of sis-
ter divisions. Model 9.1 introduces the variable STATUS. The coefficient is not statisti-
cally significant. And Model 9.2 includes the interaction term between STATUS and 
ijOVERLAP . The coefficient of the interaction term is not statistically significant either. 
Thus, Hypothesis 6 was rejected. 
Models 10.1 and 10.2 test the moderating role of executive compensation scheme 
( fEXECCOMP ). Hypothesis 7 states that executive compensation schemes that empha-
size firm-level performance rather than division-level performance (i.e., cooperation ori-
ented) would strengthen the impact of intra-firm divisional overlap on inter-divisional 
new product distance. Model 10.1 introduces the variable fEXECCOMP . The coeffi-
cient is not statistically significant. Model 10.2 includes the interaction between 
fEXECCOMP and ijOVERLAP . The coefficient is significant (p<.05), but its sign is not 
in the expected direction. Thus, Hypothesis 7 was rejected. 
Model 11 introduces the variable STATUSDIFF to test Hypothesis 8 which 
states that the lower the status of division i, relative to that of division j, the farther away 
division i would locate its new product from the products division j. The coefficient is 
significant (p<.05), but its sign is not consistent with the prediction. Thus, Hypothesis 8 
was rejected. 
Model 12 is a full model for the current part of the study. In this model several 
coefficients, which were not significant in the previous models, became statistically sig-
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nificant. STATUS became statistically significant (-0.7126, p<.01), suggesting that divi-
sions with higher status would be less likely to differentiate their new models from the 
models of sister divisions than from divisions with lower status. This result is consistent 
with our prediction. The interaction term between ijOVERLAP  and fEXECCOMP is sta-
tistically significant, but the sign is still in the opposite direction.   
The estimates reported in Table 10 are obtained by car model-specific random-
effects GLS estimation of equation (4.7). To check whether the estimates would have 
been different if fixed-effects estimation had been used, I did a Hausman specification 
test on Model 12. The test results show that the random-effects estimates are not system-
atically different from the fixed-effects estimates (χ2=2.26, df=4; p=.69).30 And it should 
be noted that no selection effect was found for any model specification in Table 10, sug-
gesting that sample selection might not be a serious issue for the estimation. 
In summation, this study didn’t find support for the positive impact of the level 
of inter-divisional overlap on inter-divisional new product distances, at least from the 
current sample. Even though the hypotheses themselves were rejected, this study found a 
couple of interesting results. First, as in the case of inter-firm overlap ( irOVERLAP ) and 
inter-firm divisional new product distances ( irmNEWDIST ), inter-divisional overlap be-
tween two divisions would make a division with higher level of overlap, proportional to 
its own divisional domain, to locate its new models closer to the other division’s models, 
i.e., less product differentiation from the sister division’s models and consequently more 
potential for inter-divisional product cannibalization. Second, the results showed that a 
division with lower status would not necessarily refrain from launching a new model that 
could be quite close to the models of a division with higher status. 
                                                
30 Note that model df for the Hausman test is 4. This is because all the variables except for OVERLAP-
related variables and STATUSDIFF were dropped in corresponding fixed-effects estimation. 
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Summary of the Results 
 
In the previous section the results of car model-specific random-effects GLS es-
timation were reported. In addition to this random-effects GLS estimation, I did a couple 
of additional analyses on the same specifications for comparison. First, I obtained OLS 
estimates to check whether there are any significant systematic differences in terms of 
magnitude and sign of the estimates. I spotted some changes in magnitude, but didn’t 
find any changes in signs or significance level. Second, I ran a division-specific random-
effects GLS estimation to take into account the fact that observations that belong to the 
same division are not independent from each other (i.e., errors are correlated) and to 
check whether there are any significant and systematic differences from the current es-
timates. Again I spotted some changes in magnitude, but didn’t find any changes in signs 
or significance level. 
In addition to a couple of additional analyses on the same specifications, I did a 
couple of extra analyses, this time, with slightly different specifications. First, I included 
a dummy variable for GM to check whether GM exhibits different behaviors. No clear 
systematic differences were found. And, I also estimated the equations using lagged 
main variables (3 year-lag) to take into account the time to develop a new car model and 
to check any systematic differences from the current results. I found no systematic dif-
ferences from the current estimates in terms of sign and significance level. 
In total, this study tested 8 hypotheses using Heckman’s two-step estimation. The 
hypotheses, their predictions, and the results from the current sample are as follows. 
 
   
  
119
TABLE 11 
Summary of the Results 
 
Hypotheses Predictions Results 
Hypothesis 1 
A division with higher status would locate its new prod-
ucts farther away from its own existing products (i.e., 
more intra-divisional product differentiation) 
Rejected 
Hypothesis 2 
The expected effect of divisional status on intra-
divisional new product distance would be stronger when 
competitive uncertainty is high 
Rejected 
Hypothesis 3 
A division with a higher level of inter-firm divisional 
domain overlap with a rival division, proportional to its 
own divisional domain, would locate its new product 
closer to the rival division’s products (i.e., less inter-
firm product differentiation) 
Sup-
ported 
Hypothesis 4 
The expected effect of inter-firm divisional overlap on 
inter-firm new product distance would be weaker when 
the density of a division is high 
Rejected 
Hypothesis 5 
A division with higher level of intra-firm divisional 
overlap with a sister division, proportional to its own di-
visional domain, would locate its new product farther 
away from the sister division’s products (i.e., more in-
ter-divisional product differentiation) 
Rejected 
Hypothesis 6 
The expected effect of intra-firm divisional overlap on 
inter-divisional new product distance would be weaker 
when the status of a division is high 
Rejected 
Hypothesis 7 
The expected effect of intra-firm divisional overlap on 
inter-divisional new product distance would be stronger 
when a firm‘s executive compensation is more tied to 
overall firm performance 
Rejected 
Hypothesis 8 
A division with lower status would locate its new prod-
ucts farther away from the products of a sister division 
with higher status 
Rejected 
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CHAPTER VI 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
In the previous chapter, I reported the results of Heckman two-step estimation. 
The results include the estimates of probit analysis (i.e., selection equation of Heckman 
two-step estimation) and car model-specific random-effects GLS estimates (i.e., regres-
sion equation). I mainly focused on the results of car model-specific random-effects GLS 
estimation and their proper interpretation since our main interest lies in the regression 
equation rather than the selection equation. In this chapter, I discuss the results reported 
in the previous chapter. The discussion is focused not only on the hypothesis that re-
ceived support, but also on other interesting outcomes that may provide some insights on 
a division’s new product location choice.  
 
Implications 
 
The main result of this study is that a division’s inter-firm divisional overlap with 
a rival division would affect the division’s new product location choice vis-à-vis that ri-
val division: the higher the level of inter-firm divisional domain overlap of a focal divi-
sion with a rival division, proportional to this focal division’s own divisional domain, the 
closer this focal division’s new product vis-à-vis that rival division’s existing products. 
Here products are car models and a new product refers to a new car model. 
This result of inter-firm divisional new product distance extends the arguments of 
divisionalization in industrial organization economics. IO economists have argued that 
divisionalization is more profitable than remaining as ‘a unified whole’ because a firm 
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with autonomous divisions ends up producing more products and consequently being 
more aggressive than firms without multiple divisions (Corchon, 1991; Schwartz and 
Thompson, 1986; Veendorp, 1991; Polasky, 1992; Baye, et al., 1996a, 1996b). The re-
sult of inter-firm divisional new product distance suggests that, at least in a differentiated 
product industry, a firm can become more aggressive than other firms by appropriately 
divisionalizing itself vis-à-vis competitors, without producing far more products than 
competitors. This study basically suggests that a firm could be more aggressive by split-
ting the product market such that its divisions would have a higher level of inter-firm di-
visional domain overlap with the rival divisions of a competitor. 
This result on inter-firm divisional overlap also provides evidence of mimicry be-
tween firms with a high level of market overlap or multimarket contact (Greve, 1996), at 
the division-dyad level. A division’s decision to locate its new product closer to rival di-
visions’ products suggests that over time a division with higher degree of inter-firm divi-
sional overlap with rival divisions of a competing firm may expand its divisional do-
main. Through a series of mimetic processes in new product location choice, the divi-
sional structure or charters of competing firms would look more or less alike. And this 
may further lead to a long-term consistency between the organizational structures of 
competing firms.  
Another interesting result, related to inter-firm divisional new product distance, 
is the impact of the density of a division in new product location choice. It was found 
that a division with a high level of divisional density (i.e., divisional domain is quite 
crowed with products) is more likely to locate its new car model closer to rival models. 
This result suggests that product proliferation and resultant high level of divisional den-
sity may not only dissuade potential entrants from entering the market (Schmalensee, 
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1978), but also persuade divisions to act aggressively toward rival divisions by locating 
their new products a little bit closer to rival products.  
It should be noted, however, that it is not clear whether this result of divisional 
density also implies that divisions may take into account the possibility of intra-
divisional cannibalization (i.e., cannibalizing their own products) when they locate their 
new product (here models). This is because it was also found that the level of divisional 
density had a negative impact on intra-divisional new product distance, suggesting that 
high-density divisions are more likely to locate their new products closer to their own 
products. Interestingly this study didn’t find a significant result regarding the impact of 
divisional density on intra-firm divisional new product location choice.   
 
In addition to inter-firm divisional issues, I also investigated a division’s intra-
firm divisional domain overlap and its impact on this division’s new product location 
choice vis-à-vis a sister division. The results showed that the higher the level of a focal 
division’s domain overlap with a sister division, proportional to its own divisional do-
main, the closer this focal division would locate its new car model to that sister divi-
sion’s existing models (i.e., less product differentiation), which is the opposite of the 
prediction. This result is not consistent with some of recent studies that found coopera-
tion among divisions of the same studio in distributing movies (Corts, 2001) and fran-
chisors’ efforts to assign outlets to franchisees in such a manner to reduce intra-
organizational multimarket contacts (Kalnins, 2003). One explanation for this finding is 
that this study is primarily concerned with divisionalization along with product markets, 
whereas Kalnins (2003) is focused on franchisees (units) that are based on geographic 
regions and Corts (2001) is concerned with divisions that don’t have unique divisional 
charters. 
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Related to the negative impact of inter-firm divisional overlap on inter-firm divi-
sional new product distance, the negative relationship between intra-firm divisional 
overlap and intra-firm divisional new product distance might be due to the common an-
tecedent of capability overlap (cf. Thomas and Weigelt, 2000). Since divisions with a 
high level of divisional overlap (inter- and intra-) should have common capabilities 
which would make them introduce products with similar features, it might not be 
surprising to find that the level of domain overlap should have a negative effect on new 
product distances. 
This result of intra-firm divisional new product distance, combined with low 
mean value of intra-divisional new product distance, may suggest that divisions are al-
ready very broadly defined. That is, even though divisions started with their distinctive 
divisional charters in the first place, over time they have tended to lose their initial focus. 
This has increased the potential for inter-divisional product cannibalization that may 
need corporate headquarters’ intervention. 
Another interesting result is the impact of status differences between two sister 
divisions on new product location choice. I expected that lower-status divisions would 
locate its new product farther way from the products of higher-status divisions; but the 
result turned out to be the opposite. This finding may be due to the use of a so-called 
global platform in the automobile industry. Usually an automobile firm develops a plat-
form for multiple models to spread out the cost of new product development and intro-
duction. Automobile firms usually build at least two versions: higher-end and lower-end 
versions. It is a kind of convention that high status divisions are responsible for market-
ing a higher-end version whereas low status divisions market a lower-end version. Since 
the two versions share the common platform, their product features are more likely to be 
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similar to each other, which may contribute to the negative relationship between status 
difference and new product distance vis-à-vis a sister division with higher status. 
Contrary to the expectation, the results show that sample selection bias may not 
pose a serious problem in the current sample. Except for a couple of model specifica-
tions for intra-divisional new product distance, the other model specifications didn’t 
produce statistically significant coefficients for the sample selection bias. This result is 
surprising in that the range of the inverse Mills ratio clearly suggests the existence of 
truncation effects. Regression diagnostics suggest that this result is not due to multicol-
linearity between the inverse Mills ratio and other explanatory variables in the regression 
equations. This result might have something to do with the probit model specification in 
the first place, judging from the low explanatory power of the probit model specification 
in predicting new car model introductions. This warrants further investigation, which is 
beyond the scope of the current study. 
 
Limitations of the Study and Suggestions for Future Research 
 
One of the limitations is about the generalizability of the results. This study used 
data on the U.S. automobile industry between 1979 and 1999. Specifically the data that 
were used in the analyses include observations of passenger cars (no SUVs, vans, or 
trucks) offered by the firms with multiple divisions, which may further limit the implica-
tions of the results. First, the exclusion of sing-division firms might not be a big issue for 
intra-divisional and intra-firm divisional new product distance and related estimations, 
since these two aspects of divisionalization, by definition, require the existence of multi-
ple divisions. But the exclusion may raise an issue for inter-firm divisional new product 
distance and related estimation since the distance is calculated against the models of-
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fered by firms with multiple divisions, not by single-division firms. This could have in-
flated inter-firm distance, which might have downplayed the possibility and effect of 
competition with rival models. Second, the exclusion of SUVs and vans might have in-
flated the distances of a new model vis-à-vis its own division’s and sister division’s ex-
isting models since the divisions that offer passenger cars also offer SUVs and vans. And 
the inclusion of SUVs and vans might have affected the ranges of inter- and intra-firm 
divisional domain overlap since some divisions offer SUVs whereas other divisions 
don’t, i.e., the variance of overlap measures would have increased. In summation, the in-
clusion of SUVs and Vans might have decreased the variance of the dependent variables 
(i.e., intra-divisional, inter-firm, and intra-firm new product distances) and at the same 
time it might have increased the variance of the variables of interest such as the degree 
of divisional overlaps (both inter-firm and intra-firm), which suggests that the current 
sample and estimations might have understated the true standard errors and conse-
quently overstated the estimated significance levels.  
Another limitation is that this study approaches divisionalization from three 
separate angles. And except for intra-divisional new product distance, the main focus is 
division-dyad. This approach is based on a rather strong assumption that a division can 
locate its new product in such a location that satisfies all three aspects simultaneously: 
intra-divisional distance, inter-firm divisional distance for sister division, and intra-firm 
divisional distance for any rival division. Without this strong assumption, division-dyad-
based distance for intra-firm and inter-firm divisional new product distances might not 
make much sense. 
And it should also be noted that I didn’t model a firm’s strategic decision that 
could have very broad ramifications over all divisions. A firm’s strategic decisions that 
could charter new product categories would, in turn, affect a division’s decision of prod-
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uct location choice. This part of the equation is not explicitly addressed in the current 
study. For a more complete understanding of a division’s product location choice, it is 
desirable to include this aspect. 
 
The results provide several interesting future research topics. One such direction 
is about the distribution of divisional status among divisions in the firm and its impact on 
overall innovation activities of the firm. This would provide another way to look at in-
novation. If the status distribution is uniform, would this increase radical innovation or 
incremental innovation? If every division has roughly equal status relative to the others, 
we could expect that no single division could dominate the other divisions in the process 
of resource allocation for its own advantage. If resources are equally split, then we may 
not expect an architectural innovation from the firms with this kind of distribution. But 
we may expect a series of incremental innovations by each division to gain an edge over 
other divisions with equal status. Then how about a skewed distribution where one divi-
sion holds very high status whereas others don’t? The distribution of divisional statuses 
would dictate resource allocation, which would affect overall firm innovations. 
And it would be interesting if future research can develop a holistic view on new 
product location by incorporating three aspects of divisionalization into one framework. 
By approaching divisionalization and its impact simultaneously, we could test whether 
three aspects of divisionalization would have an impact of different magnitudes and di-
rections on new product location. For instance, we could test whether intra-firm divi-
sional overlap has a significant impact on a division’s product location choice vis-à-vis 
rival products or its own existing products, in addition to vis-à-vis a sister division’s ex-
isting products. This might bring in new insights in understanding a division’s product 
location choice.  
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Conclusion 
 
This study argues that a firm’s product location choice may be a function of the 
firm’s way of splitting the product market (i.e., divisionalization) and the concern for 
product cannibalization at the division and the firm levels. The focus of this study is at 
the division level and a division’s new product location choice vis-à-vis its own products 
(intra-divisional new product distance), the products of a rival division of competing 
firms (inter-firm divisional new product distance), and the products of a sister division of 
the same firm (intra-firm divisional new product distance). The hypotheses were tested 
using data on the U.S. automobile industry between 1979 and 1999. 
This study found that a focal division with a high level of inter-firm divisional 
domain overlap with a rival division, proportional to the focal division’s own domain, is 
more likely to locate its new product (here new car model) closer to that rival’s existing 
car models. And it was also found that divisional density affects a division’s new prod-
uct location choice. But this study didn’t find any significant role of divisional status on 
new product location choice. And contrary to our expectation, the results of intra-firm 
divisional domain overlap and new product location choice suggest that inter-divisional 
product cannibalization might not be such an important concern when divisions intro-
duce their new products, as we had originally expected.  
By addressing the firm’s competitive engagement in the context of a division’s 
new product location choice, this study expands the basic logic of market overlap at the 
firm level into the unit- or division-level, and highlights how a division’s new product 
location choice is affected by intra-firm divisional structural relationship as well as inter-
firm divisional structural relationship. In so doing, this study hopes to contribute to the 
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literature on divisionalization, new product location choice, competition at the unit-level, 
and product cannibalization, among others.  
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FIGURE 5.1 
Utility Index: GM vs. Ford (1996) 
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FIGURE 5.2 
Utility Index: GM vs. Chrysler (1996) 
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FIGURE 5.3 
Utility Index: GM vs. Toyota vs. Honda (1996) 
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FIGURE 5.4 
Utility Index: Chrysler vs. Ford vs. Toyota vs. Honda (1996) 
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TABLE 2 
Results of Instrumental Variable (IV) Estimation 
 
IV Estimation OLS Estimation
Independent Variables
Coff Std Coeff Coff Std Coeff
Dependent Variable: Log(Price)
Intercept 7.7358 ** 8.7603 **
(0.174) (0.128)
Wheel Base 0.0071 ** 0.0982 7.7E-03 ** 0.1067
(0.001) (0.001)
Length 0.0064 ** 0.1782 0.0032 ** 0.0885
(0.001) (0.001)
Width -0.0121 ** -0.0807 -0.0229 ** -0.1534
(0.003) (0.003)
Horse Power 0.0062 ** 0.6037 0.0078 ** 0.7516
(0.000) (0.000)
Mile Per Gallon -0.0015 -0.0162 -6.4E-03 ** -0.0682
(0.002) (0.001)
Trend 0.0068 ** 0.0697 3.4E-03 ** 0.0351
(0.001) (0.001)
Market Share -41.0034 ** -0.5697 -11.71135 ** -0.1627
(2.158) (0.672)
Number of Observations 3379 3379
F-value 916 ** 1396.05 **
R 2 0.60 0.74
Hausman Test (Ho=No systematic difference)
χ2 (6) 203.93 **
 + p<.1; * p<.05; ** p<.01  
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Independent Variables Model
DV: New Product Introduction (1/0)
Intercept 0.3135 (0.673)
Total No. of Products in Market (MKTPRODS) -0.0007 (0.002)
No. of Own Division's Products (DIVPRODS) 0.0339 (0.014) *
Division Size (DIVSIZE) -0.2502 (0.057) **
Firm Size (FIRMSIZE) 0.0948 (0.056) +
Fixed Cost (FIXCOST) -0.0006 (0.000) **
Number of Observations 4996
Log Likelihood -698
LR χ2 41 **
Pesudo R 2 0.03
 + p<.1; * p<.05; ** p<.01
TABLE 4 
Results of Probit Estimation (Selection Equation) 
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